Executive Summary
- On October 25, Israel executed a meticulously planned air assault on 20 military sites across Iran, primarily missile production and strategic air defense facilities.
- The Biden administration’s restraints on the Israeli political and military leadership limited the scope of the strikes. But Israel likely handicapped Iran’s ability to produce the high-end, solid-fuel, medium-range ballistic missiles that Tehran used in its October 1 salvos.
- To help defend the skies above Israel, the United States provided its ally with Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti–ballistic missile systems.
- Iran’s response to the strikes will shape the dynamics of intra-war deterrence and escalation dominance in the Middle East.
Israel’s Aerial Assault: An Overview
Israel used around 100 combat aircraft, and possibly drone warfare systems, to execute its aerial assault on Iran. Attacking in three waves, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) targeted Tehran’s missile manufacturing capabilities and strategic air defense architecture. Israel’s target set clearly suggests it intended to erode Iran’s critical missile production capacity and facilitate further military action if the conflict escalates.
But an examination of what Israel refrained from targeting is equally important for understanding the geopolitical implications of the strikes. Israel’s relative restraint reflects the Biden administration’s unwillingness to retaliate against Iranian aggression in kind and at scale.
Assessing the Operational Concepts of Israel’s Strikes
Videos released by the Israeli Air Force reveal that F-15 and F-16 tactical military aviation platforms took part in its strikes on Iran. The limited availability of information makes it impossible to confirm whether Israel used F-35 fifth-generation stealth aircraft. But it is plausible that the F-35’s state-of-the-art sensors and command and control capabilities played a role in the campaign.
Additional evidence suggests that Israel employed air-launched standoff aeroballistic missiles in the attack. These missiles possess highly destructive warheads and long effective ranges. This allowed Israel’s non-stealth, fourth-generation airframes to stay out of range of Tehran’s air defenses while striking high-priority sites in Iran. In addition, the IDF likely kept multiple combat search-and-rescue teams on high alert while its strike packages were in the skies.
Israel’s target set focused on Iran’s missile and drone production hubs and strategic surface-to-air missile (SAM) network. The targets Israel struck at Parchin and Khojir play important roles in the manufacture of solid-propellant missiles like the Kheibar Shekan medium-range ballistic missile that Iran used in its October 1 attack on Israel. Because facilities at Parchin are also involved in Tehran’s nuclear program, this attack sent a strong message about what Israel might strike next if Iran escalates further.
Open-source satellite imagery reveals that Israel inflicted significant damage to Iranian solid fuel mixing buildings and storage warehouses. Israeli forces also struck the Shahroud missile complex. This facility is essential for the proliferation of high-end projectiles like the Fattah and Kheibar Shekan medium-range ballistic missiles, as well as for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program.
Prior to its strikes, the IDF eliminated air defenses in Syria to pave the way for its attacks on the Islamic Republic. Although press sources also reported a similar action in Iraq, this report could not confirm it. Israel also systematically eliminated Iran’s long-range air defenses, most notably the Russian S-300 strategic SAMs Tehran used to protect its critical energy infrastructure and ports. In the process, the Israeli Air Force killed several Iranian air defense servicemen.
Imagery intelligence also suggests that the Israeli Air Force hit several of Iran’s Ghadir radar installations, hosting derivatives of Russian Rezonans-NE radar systems designed to detect stealth aircraft. In recent years, the Islamic Republic has fielded these sensor complexes to augment its air defense architecture. Russian sources claim that Iran has shown particular interest in Rezonans-NE radars to address the threat that F-35 aircraft pose to its airspace.
Unless Russia can quickly replace these systems with new S-300s or S-400s and capable radar complexes (while also meeting its own needs in its highly attritional war in Ukraine), Iran will lack any meaningful air defense against Israeli follow-on strikes.
Operational Constraints on Israel
While Israel’s air raids went beyond mere surgical strikes, the attack carefully avoided Iran’s energy infrastructure and most sites involved in Tehran’s nuclear program. Israel, moreover, did not target high-level members of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps or Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s inner circle.
The Biden administration was not the only constraint on the scope of Israel’s strikes. Israel’s weapons stockpiles are also a factor. Iran’s large salvos of medium-range ballistic missiles have depleted Israel’s stocks of high-altitude anti-ballistic missile systems with exoatmospheric interception features. Given the offense-dominant characteristics of missile warfare, Israel is quickly running out of interceptors for its Arrow family of anti–ballistic missile systems.
While Israel’s defense technological and industrial base has increased its production rates for these systems as security in the Middle East has deteriorated, Israel’s industrial capacity still lags what it needs. Moreover, since the Arrow 3 is designed to prevent nuclear fallout by intercepting ballistic missiles carrying weapons of mass destruction at the exoatmospheric level, Israel needs to preserve these interceptors. As a result, Israel has to rely on Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems supplied and operated by United States forces even though US stockpiles of these systems are low.
What’s Next?
Israel’s strikes did considerable damage to Iran’s missile production capabilities and strategic air defenses while avoiding any direct hits on the Islamic Republic’s energy infrastructure or its leaders. Continued restraints from the Biden administration ahead of US elections, as well as the Israeli government’s desire to avoid an extended exchange with Iran that would stress the IDF’s interceptor stockpiles, will likely temper Israel’s actions moving forward.
As such, Tehran’s response to Israel will set the near-term trajectory of the conflict. Should Iran repeat its October 1 strikes by launching a barrage of long-range assets, Israel could respond by targeting Iran’s oil facilities, ports, nuclear program, and leadership.
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