Amid rising diplomatic tensions between the United States and Ukraine and between Washington and its European allies, this special edition of the Ukraine Military Situation Report by Can Kasapoğlu offers a battlefield assessment and three plausible outcomes for the conflict in Ukraine.
Battlefield Assessment
Last week both sides won modest tactical gains. But no strategic changes altered the map significantly.
In eastern Ukraine, areas adjacent to Pokrovsk saw continued intensive combat, while the southern theater was relatively calm. In occupied Kherson, the Ukrainian Separate 14th Regiment successfully targeted a Russian training ground with cluster munitions. In Ukraine’s north, near Kharkiv, Russia conducted air and missile strikes. The Russian military continued to suffer more than 1,000 casualties per day, and Ukraine carried out multiple loitering munitions salvos targeting the Russian hydrocarbon network.
Kursk was a notable exception to the general battlefield stasis. Russia has been pushing hard in Kursk following the return of North Korean servicemen to combat operations. Alarmingly, the Ukrainian military lost 15 to 20 square miles in less than a week.
Ukrainian defense intelligence officials announced that they have been tracking a serious hike in Russian drone proliferation efforts, with the joint Russia-Iran drone plant in the Russian Republic of Tatarstan boosting production capacity. According to other Ukrainian officials, the Russian military has long sought to achieve the capability to launch 500 drones at Ukraine in a single salvo, a dangerous strike pattern if it can be realized. The increase in Russia’s drone production is an important trend that this report will continue to monitor.
Three Scenarios for the Future of the Conflict in Ukraine
While the conflict in Ukraine continues to evolve and the diplomatic picture remains dynamic, three possible outcomes seem most likely.
Scenario 1: Managed Decline
The first plausible outcome is that Ukraine manages to stabilize the front lines through tactical withdrawals in the face of mounting losses. In this scenario, the Ukrainian military continues to demonstrate resilience despite its declining capabilities and the rupture in Kyiv’s partnership with the United States. Nonetheless, Ukraine would need to withdraw its forces from Kursk to augment defensive operations at home, costing Kyiv invaluable leverage.
Ukraine would endure a slow decline in its military capabilities while forestalling collapse. Ukraine’s domestic drone proliferation edge and extensive antipersonnel and anti-armor mine capabilities would help it stabilize the front. Yet it would continue to face challenges from manpower shortages. Kyiv’s indigenous loitering munitions and hybrid weapons would help it target Russian energy and defense hubs. But Russian, North Korean, and Iranian weapons would continue to pound Ukrainian cities, where the Ukrainian military would have to prioritize protecting high-value targets.
This scenario would likely involve continued deterioration in bilateral security and defense ties between Washington and Kyiv, but not a rapid halt in arms flows. Pending arms transfers already in the pipeline would continue, particularly under the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, a framework that has created new contracts between Kyiv and American defense suppliers. Under this scenario arms flows to Ukraine could continue until 2028, though likely dropping below $1 billion in volume by the second quarter of 2027.
This would mean the battlefield geometry in Ukraine would remain largely the same. Still, losing control over its territory in Kursk would deprive Kyiv of critical diplomatic leverage to negotiate a return of its Russian-occupied territories.
Scenario 2: The Worst Case
In the second plausible scenario for the future of the conflict, Russian and North Korean fighters overpower Ukraine with a massive surge, attaining a decisive force-on-force ratio in multiple sectors. In the absence of US military aid and intelligence support, Ukraine faces serious setbacks in its defensive combat operations. Kyiv is forced to surrender, and European nations offer only diplomatic gestures.
This is no doubt a worst-case scenario for Ukraine. In the absence of American intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assistance at the strategic and operational levels, Ukraine would face catastrophic personnel losses. Without sufficient support, Russia could break Ukraine’s defensive lines and force its government to capitulate—the original political aim of Russia’s full-scale invasion.
In this scenario, North Korean troops would play a decisive role in turning the tide for Russia. The US Defense Intelligence Agency has concluded that the bulk of Pyongyang’s combat formations in Kursk belong to North Korea’s 11th Corps, a strategic force trained to open a second front in a conventional conflict or attack an enemy’s rear area. According to the South Korean intelligence service, this North Korean contingent recently resumed combat operations in Kursk following a rotation period. In a worst-case scenario, North Korea could increase its force size from division-level to corps-level and begin to fight on Ukrainian territory, rather than just in Kursk.
Russia could initiate another limited mobilization effort in the meantime. Together with forces from North Korea, such an effort could add between 300,000 and 350,000 troops to the 580,000 to 620,000 servicemen Russia has already deployed in Ukraine and Kursk. Ukraine’s forces number roughly 800,000, but only one-fourth of this force has been sent to direct combat roles on the front lines. The force-on-force ratio between Ukrainian and Russian troop concentrations already favors the invader at varying proportions in different sectors, ranging from 1:2 to 1:6. A Russian and North Korean force-generation push would make things even worse for Ukraine.
Sadly, Europe’s defense industry is not in a position to support Ukraine in a prolonged conflict where Russia and its allies can ramp up production at will. The European Union, following extensive discussions, aims to boost its annual artillery production to 2 million rounds in 2025. Yet North Korea alone can produce the same amount in peacetime. Pyongyang has delivered up to 6 million rounds to the Russian military in two years, hinting at its wartime production capacity. Russia’s annual round-production capacity is believed to be somewhere between 3 million rounds and 4.5 million rounds for principal guns.
Türkiye, which is in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization but not the EU, is the only European nation that produces multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS). European nations largely rely on American M-270 and M-142 HIMARS systems, though some turn to Israel or South Korea for stopgap procurements. Europe also lags in the production of air and missile defense interceptors, a troubling trend while Russia hammers Ukraine with Iran-made drones. Since September 2024 Russia has launched at least 1,000 Shahed drones per month. November 2024 and January 2025 each saw over 2,500 loitering munitions launched at Ukrainian population centers.
American-made Patriot systems have been the primary long-range and high-altitude layer of Ukraine’s surface-to-air missile defenses. While the European SAMP/T could theoretically replace the American Patriot, the European solution has a more focused design that aims at ballistic missiles and aircraft but lacks the Patriot’s ability to target broad-spectrum threats from drones to cruise missiles. Intercepting drones does not require the use of long-range SAMs. But these robotic systems complicate the air picture and overwhelm layered air defenses, paving the way for follow-on ballistic missile and cruise missile salvos.
More important, the Patriot has a larger market share and a more substantial production capacity for its PAC-2 and PAC-3 interceptors. Moreover, the Patriot is the only reliable weapons system Kyiv has against high-hypersonic aeroballistic missiles like the Russian Kinzhal. Given its air defense challenges, Ukraine needs a constant flow of Patriot interceptors to protect its skies.
In a collapse scenario, Ukraine’s manpower shortages and difficulty stabilizing the front would only exacerbate its air defense troubles. Major breaches in Ukrainian lines of defense in the east and a successful Russian push on various flashpoints like Pokrovsk could spell doom for Ukraine.
In this scenario, the Kremlin could force Kyiv to capitulate. Ukraine could be compelled to swallow a partial demilitarization and the loss of almost 20 percent of its territory. NATO and its member states would not legally recognize this outcome, but in the absence of credible US deterrents, the de facto arrangement could quickly become the status quo.
Scenario 3: The Best Case
The final possible scenario for the future of Ukraine is a significant shift in the conflict’s dynamics. It would see a revival of US-Ukraine relations, marked by the signing of a valuable minerals deal and the introduction of new indigenous and foreign loitering munitions systems and drone-missile hybrid weapons to drastically enhance Ukraine’s long-range strike capabilities.
In this scenario, systematic Ukrainian attacks continue to damage Russian hydrocarbon revenues. The Ukrainian occupation of Kursk deepens and stabilizes. US-led diplomatic pressure prompts Russia’s political leadership to discuss a comprehensive ceasefire, including a territorial swap. Ukraine retains near-ally status with NATO and faces no restrictions in keeping its military capacity in the aftermath of the war. This scenario, if realized, could significantly alter Ukraine’s future—and the Kremlin’s geopolitical orientation.
This would require a revival of bilateral ties between Washington and Kyiv. A minerals deal between the two countries would catalyze Western investment opportunities in Ukraine, creating a tangible deterrent against further Russian escalation. In the meantime, the Ukrainian military would continue to benefit from the nation’s growing defense industries, which have gradually integrated themselves into the West’s defense technological and industrial base.
Ukraine’s developing drone and missile warfare prowess would inflict unbearable damage on Russian energy and defense industrial targets. NATO members would make clear that they would not tolerate tactical nuclear action from the Russian military in Europe. Emboldened by lucrative arms deals with Washington in return for valuable resources and boosted European defense assistance funds, Ukraine would deepen its territorial gains in Kursk.
In this final scenario, the Kremlin could agree to a comprehensive ceasefire deal following American diplomatic efforts. Ukrainian and Russian diplomats could consider a swap of occupied territory. A multi-brigade European security assurance force could deploy to Ukrainian territory, and Ukraine could gain host-nation status for the NATO Force Model.