100 Days of the Kursk Operation: What the US Can Do to Help Ukraine

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On August 6, Ukraine launched an audacious military operation into Russia’s Kursk Oblast. One hundred days later, the Ukrainians still hold a sizeable chunk of Russian territory. The operation has achieved its initial objectives: changing the narrative of the conflict, reminding the world that Ukraine can succeed on the battlefield, and forcing Russia to commit resources to Kursk that could otherwise be used elsewhere. But Russia has started a counteroffensive in the region with the help of 10,000 North Korean troops. How can the United States help Ukraine maintain its momentum?

A distinguished panel of experts will assess the first 100 days of the Kursk operation and what to expect from the next US presidential administration.

Event Transcript

This transcription is automatically generated and edited lightly for accuracy. Please excuse any errors.

Peter Rough:

Good morning, good afternoon, good evening, depending upon where you’re joining us from. I’m Peter Rough of Hudson Institute today sitting in the moderator’s chair, and I’m welcomed by three wonderful colleagues to mark this milestone, 100 days of the Ukrainian Armed forces incursion into Kursk, Kursk Oblast of the Russian Federation, which kicked off on August 6th.

I’m thrilled to be joined from Kyiv by Glib Voloskyi of the Come Back Alive Initiative Center, a foundation which supports the Ukrainian Armed Forces with training and equipping. He’s a well-regarded defense analyst who came highly recommended to us. And by two colleagues of mine from the institute. To my right, Luke Coffey, a veteran analyst of European Affairs, and from Izmir, Turkey, Hudson’s defense analyst from Land Forces Command Headquarters in Izmir, he teaches regularly NATO officers, Can Kasapoğlu.

You’ll know Luke from his products on Hudson’s website and Can Kasapoğlu from several regular products he publishes, including a Ukraine military defense update, which is published Wednesdays. You can sign up for that online. And I’d like to in particular draw your attention to a publication that came out in September, How to Help Ukraine Succeed in its Kursk Offensive co-authored by Luke and Can.

Thanks so much for joining us and we’ll begin with an opening round and I’d like to go straight to Ukraine to Glib. Glib, could you give us an overall assessment, give us the basics of where we stand 100 days into this operation?

Glib Voloskyi:

Absolutely. Yeah, thank you. It’s a great pleasure and great honor to talk to you here today. And as a Ukrainian analyst, I would like to use this opportunity to express my gratitude for the active and vocal support of Hudson Institute for support that it gives Ukraine. In a time of such geopolitical changes, it is crucial to have an American leadership, indispensable for secure and free and prosperous world and for future of all of us. It is important that we have institutes that keep reminding us of it. And that’s why I would like to thank you.

One of the clear sign of such political changes that we have is, of course, Kursk operation. If five years ago someone had said that Ukraine would occupy part of the Russia, that would not appear as a sensible insight. Yet, here we are. The Kursk operation began as a tactical and operational success. Ukraine managed to achieve an operational surprise and conduct deep maneuverable operation. And both are quite an achievement on the highly transparent battleground because of the sensors, satellites, and the drones that swarm in the air,. But also because of the positional nature of this warfare where advances are typically measured in yards rather than miles.

It is interestingly that Russian military commanders knew about the concentration of Ukrainian forces, yet they misinterpreted their intent. This made the separation much similar to the Kupyansk, Iman operation that Ukraine conducted two years ago. Much in the same way, Russian commanders misinterpreted the intentions of the Ukrainian movements. Much in the same way, Ukrainian penetrated deep into Russian territory, ambushing retreating forces, and cutting off foreign forces. And in both cases, Russian command and control systems seemed paralyzed and unable to condemnate and denigrate resistance.

Yet in both cases, Russia eventually restored control of its forces. Deployed reinforces quickly diverted from second reparational directions and started slow gruesome, but partially successful contra attack. In Kursk, we see a large-scale counterattack in mid-September. And since then, Russia managed to regain between 25 and 40 percent of its territory depending on what sources you cite. But basically, most of them agreed that Ukraine still hold a larger chunk of the territory that it initially says. Currently, we see that Russia is preparing for another big push. It has deployed quite significant part with its armed forces, some of them North Korea, but I’m sure my colleagues will want to elaborate on this.

Peter Rough:

Well, thanks so much. Heading to nearby Turkey, south across the Black Sea Can Kasapoğlu, you follow this war daily and also through many a sleepless night. Give us a sense tactically what is happening on the ground. I think the average observer recognizes that this is really an intense and brutal fight right now. But take us under the hood. Give us a bit more detail, if you will.

Can Kasapoğlu:

Sure. In a nutshell, let’s first jump into the correlation of forces and the fourth generation. The Russians we see, they deploy a very interesting mix of units. We have a predominant presence of Russian Naval Infantry, the 810 brigade, which is the Crimea Garrison, and the 155 Marine Infantry. This is especially an important unit in a notorious fashion.

We saw that in our Hudson Institute specials to Ukraine with even all these messengers, this 155 Marine Infantry is one of the main responsible units behind all these messengers. Alongside the Russian Marines, we have the Russian VDV, which is the airborne troops, the strategic reserve forces of the Russian president, and one of the remaining elite within the Russian military.

And then is the North Korean contingent. Again, very briefly, these North Koreans are mainly hailing from the 11th Corps or the North Korean Special Forces. 11th Corps is a special unit. It is a notable unit within the North Korean doctrine or of battle because it is first a nucleus of the North Korean special forces, but also it is a strategic force. It is not a tactical special forces detachment. It is a strategic force. And its main expertise is to open a second front, deep penetration into the enemy combat formations rear area. And staying in that rear area and running separate combat operations. We have that interesting mix.

Here there is one important nuance that. . . Actually two important things that we should keep in mind when analyzing the North Korean involvement in the combat operations. First of all, I heard at the very beginning of the North Korean deployment some Western figures, including some government figures, some NATO figures labeling it as a sign of Russian weakness.

I couldn’t believe what I heard because imagine that right now a mix of a mixed brigade or the British Special Air Service, the US Army Rangers and the US Navy SEALs heading to Kursk to help the Ukrainian military. And one general in the Russian military with the right mind, we have few only left. For instance, General Teplinsky calling it a sign of weakness of the Ukrainian armed forces. That you have that kind of detachment coming from the West. It is not weakness. It is a sign of a coalition warfare effort because Ukraine is not only invaded by the Russian military. Ukraine is invaded by a coalition of the Russians, the Iranians as the primary drone warfare support source, and right now the North Koreans.

The second important thing to keep in mind is that within the overall balance of power between the Ukrainian and the Russian overall armed forces, 10,000 North Korean troops might be so little that you wouldn’t even notice. But within the Kursk theater, specifically injecting 2,000 troops, which is 20 percent of the overall Russian force generation right now, and roughly the half or one third of the entire Ukrainian troop presence in Kursk. You are injecting 30 percent of the Ukrainian combat formations overall manpower, or 20 percent of the overall Russian manpower in the Kursk Theater. This is something. And if it is coming from the North Korean special forces, elite of the elite within the North Korean special forces, it is something. In terms of correlation of forces or the force ratio, I would not make it into a defense geek analysis. But what we know-

Peter Rough:

You already have.

Can Kasapoğlu:

. . . in terms of military mathematical modeling, it is one to three, three to one for offensive and defensive combat operations. I can also say that the Russians also right now enjoy the upper hand in the correlation of forces. The Ukrainians deployed their three mechanized brigades, including the 47th, which means we are seeing Abrams main metal tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles and the 95th air assault brigade, which means, again, we are seeing the German heavy armor. But so far I can say that the Ukrainians are holding the ground, but operational tempo is really overwhelming.

Peter Rough:

Can, let me just stick with you for one follow-up question. And that is this 11th Corps that the DPRK has deployed, which consists of special forces, have we learned anything about the capability of the North Korean armed forces? Is it too early to tell? Are they an effective fighting force? What can you tell our viewers about North Korean forces, which after all have not fought large-scale combat operations since the 1950s?

Can Kasapoğlu:

That’s an important question, which demands for three very quick answers. First, in terms of tactical lessons learned, no, it is too early to learn from the war fighting performance of the North Koreans. We know that they had casualties. We know that the Ukrainian military has already engaged the North Korean forces. But it is, we have very limited open source intelligence. And I also believe that the Ukrainian armed forces have also limited military intelligence from the battleground as to their war fighting capabilities.

At the strategic level, however, we have some indicators suggesting that. . . And I don’t want to speculate anything, but we have three suggesting that this is yet a pioneer force for a larger follow-on deployment of North Korean forces because we have three North Korean generals overseeing the North Korean contingent right now. And one of them is number two of the overall North Korean armed forces, who also happens to be general Kim Yong-bok, who also happens to be the military advisor to Kim Jong-un. So the North Korea, it is a division-size force, but the generals overseeing that are coming from the top-notch of the North Korean military at the strategic level. It again suggests that this could be merely a pioneer force for a larger follow on deployment. The third thing we know about their equipment is that the XI Corps and in general North Korean special forces are light infantry. So, so far we have not seen any North Korean heavy armor or any other heavy warfighting equipment. So in terms of its composition, it is an elite light infantry force.

Peter Rough:

Thanks, John. Coming here to Washington, Luke, in the early days after this incursion, I detected a debate at the Pentagon between those who said, on the one hand, this is a strategic success and a brilliant stroke because it recapitalizes the POW stocks for the Ukrainians as President Zelenskyy said. It undermines some of the Land for Peace formulas, which the Ukrainians had resisted. It boosts morale in Ukraine. It grabs the attention of the West at a time when increasingly headlines were dominated by the Middle East and so on and so forth. But on the other hand, it of course stretches Ukrainian forces, which are finite because they now have to defend additional terrain on the Russian Federation. And so there are questions about whether or not it could succeed in drawing Russian forces from other sectors into Kursk. So you don’t need to necessarily address that question right off the bat, which is of course, the golden question. Is it a strategic success or strategic liability? But what are the lessons learned as you see it for policymakers? And take us to the policy level if you’re talking to decision-makers here.

Luke Coffey:

Yeah, great, Peter. Actually, you just teed it up nicely for me I have to say. I do want to look at some of. . . I want to assess some of the earlier goals of this operation and see how they have played out for Ukraine and then also highlight some of the lessons learned. One you already mentioned was the goal of shifting the narrative of the conflict. I think in this sense, a hundred days into this operation, the Ukrainians have been successful. People are talking about the war in a different way. People are reminded that if given the right equipment and with the right motivation, the Ukrainians can be successful on the battlefield. And after the shortcomings of the land counteroffensive in 2023, I think it was important that we were reminded of this. So in the sense of changing the strategic narrative about the war, I would say it’s been a success for Ukraine so far.

The other goal earlier on was the Ukrainians ensuring that the conflict could not be frozen along its current lines. And obviously this was a hedge on whatever was going to happen in the US elections. And I think again, so far this has been successful for the Ukrainians. A hundred days in, they still control a nice chunk of Kursk Oblast, which means that the front lines could not be frozen where they are today. There would have to be some sort of exchange. Who knows what that would look like. That’s purely hypothetical at this point. It’s hypothetical to discuss even if this might happen. But we do know that with Ukrainians controlling parts of Kursk Oblast, the front lines cannot be frozen where they are. So I think this was a success for Ukraine. And I think this goes actually to more on a tactical issue, which Glib and John will know better than me.

But it seems like the Ukrainians didn’t overstep in this operation. They didn’t try to capture too much with too little. Yes, the Russians have been able to take some territory back. This is unsurprising. This is the nature of warfare after all. But it seems that the Ukrainians were able to limit their ambitions into Kursk, find natural defensive lines based off terrain. And then we’re seeing the very effective use of mines and other defensive networks that the Ukrainians have established early on after their arrival. So this leads to Russia having the problems they’re having today with their counteroffensive. And then finally, the other goal was diverting. . . As you mentioned, Peter, diverting Russian resources and troops away from other parts of the front line to have to deal with what’s happening in Kursk. With this, I think the jury’s still out. I mean, admittedly, there’s limitations to what we can see through open source intelligence reporting and on social media.

There are indications that some units have been moved from different parts of the front lines in Ukraine to Kursk. Russia is now using, as was pointed out, 10,000 North Korean soldiers. So one would have to argue at a minimum, Russia is using energy and having to focus on Kursk in a way that obviously otherwise would not have had to. So this can only be positive from Ukraine’s point of view, but it’s also been reported this week at least through social media observations and open source intelligence that the Russians may have started an offensive operation in Zaporizhzhia. So if they’re able to do that, now, it’s still early days with that. No one’s quite sure what’s going on there, but if the Russians were able to do this, even with everything happening in Kursk, then maybe this diversion of Russian forces and resources to Kursk wasn’t as successful as the Ukrainians had thought it would be.

In terms of the lessons, I think that there are four lessons that we can already learn. Perhaps some are more reminders than lessons, but they’re still interesting observations nevertheless. The first one is Russia’s red lines remain elusive. We keep hearing through the course of this war, if this happens, then Russia will do this. If that happens, Russia will do that. And time and time again, we discover that actually these red lines don’t exist. And Ukraine’s advancement into Kursk Oblast, the fact that US Abrams and Bradleys are being used in Kursk, the fact that admittedly, not ATACMSs, but HIMAR missile systems have been used against bridges and other targets in Kursk shows that once again, these red lines don’t exist. The second lesson is a reminder that the unexpected happens in warfare, and we should, at the best we can prepare for this. In 2023, it was perhaps the Wagner coup that was the big shock that surprised everyone.

This year it was Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk. Next year there will be a surprise. I don’t know if it’ll come from the Russian side or the Ukrainian side, but there will be some sort of surprise. We have to understand that in this type of conflict, the unexpected happens and we have to prepare the best we can for that. The third lesson here is that morale and discipline matter. The fact that the Ukrainians were able to assemble 20 to 30,000 troops or whatever the exact figure was on the other side of the Russian border of Kursk Oblast and able to launch a surprise operation there tells me that the Ukrainian troops involved have high morale and discipline because you don’t have that level of operational security, especially in this era of social media without troops that have discipline and good morale. And then finally, and this is a point I like to hammer on about, the security of East Asia and Eastern Europe are connected.

And this is shown by the fact that North Korea is now involved in what is essentially a war in Eastern Europe. And the sooner we wake up to this realization, the better we will be in terms of a preparation and readiness for an Indo-Pacific contingency or a contingency in the South China Sea. We have to see these theaters as being connected because our adversaries show that they are connected.

Peter Rough:

Great. Well, let’s head back across the Atlantic to Glib in Kyiv. Can you give us a read now that we have an overview on tactically how things are unfolding in Kursk Oblast? If we all sit very still, it’ll just look like we’re frozen.

Glib Voloskyi:

Sorry, can you hear me now?

Peter Rough:

We can hear you now.

Glib Voloskyi:

Yeah. So as my colleagues have mentioned, Russia has accumulated significant portion of its military forces on the Kursk direction. As the military intelligence of Ukraine report, they expect to launch another large offensive operation in attempt to reclaim the territory. It slightly will start as typically Russia do with a massive volley of fire with drones, gliding bombs, and artillery. And then we’ll follow with tactical small infantry groups that will attempt to find the weak spot and infiltrate in the flank and rear Ukrainian forces, accumulate forces there, and then basically use numerical advantage to push Ukrainians out. I think it is unlikely to be concentrated on single or few directions. It’s more typical of Russia to try offensive operation across the broad front to conduct a probing attacks and then find out weaknesses in the front and exploit any penetration that they may manage to achieve. That said, I do not think that offensive operation in Kursk for Russia is going to be a pleasant walk. So as we’ve seen in this war, defenses really dominate over weapons, over offensive and Russia is likely to struggle considerably to break through the violent trench positions of the Ukrainian military. The Kursk part that Ukrainian military control is also quite favorable for defensive operation because of the large number of water obstacles and tree line, the forest that can be used to conceal troops, and designed to the defense positions. So, what we likely expect to see is the situation similar, that we observe in the Kupyansk or Pokrovsk, some slow progress with the mind-blowing casualties from the Russian side. The question is whether Ukraine will be able to retreat Russia quickly enough to preserve some part of the territory that is under its control. Or even more importantly, to retreat it enough to not let Russia. . . To continue offensive operation in the Sumy region, where the City of Sumy Regional Center is situated just near the border, or alternatively to redeploy forces to other operational directions after Russia conducted separation in Kursk.

Peter Rough:

Glib, how do you assess or what is your assessment of how Ukraine’s ongoing manpower mobilization is going? Are the troop numbers leveling up to where it is necessary to be able to hold the line or to conduct an effective even retreat in defense in certain areas?

Glib Voloskyi:

Well, the mobilization tempo has improved and the Ukraine adopt the Mobilization Law in spring the last year. That said, the huge problem for Ukraine is not only tempo-mobilization, but exceeding tempo-mobilization from Russia, because Russia keep creating new brigades or stretching Ukrainian forces, and we see that Ukraine just simply don’t have enough power to simultaneously protect Kursk, Kupyansk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and some of the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson position that still being assaulted. That said, again, Ukraine tried to trade land for attrition that slowly fall back and the three Russian forces, and we, of course, have to understand that Russia cannot conduct this offensive operation forever. At some point, it’ll have to stop and regroup, which also gives Ukrainian that much necessary break to regroup its own forces and to fortify positions.

Peter Rough:

John, before I ask you whether you agree with that assessment, let me go back to the North Korea dimension since I know you’ve spent a lot of time studying extra regional actors in this conflict, in particular, the Iranian Drone Program and now also the DPRK. If you were advising President Zelensky or the general staff in Ukraine, what would you suggest they ask the South Koreans to do to support and counteract this North Korean move?

Can Kasapoğlu:

Well, first of all, this is a very artillery-hungry and artillery-driven war. And South Korea has very large capacity in especially 155 millimeter artillery. We have seen two important transitions, one in the making, one already done in the Ukrainian military. Ukrainian military was the operator, principally, 152 millimeter Soviet Russian class artillery at the beginning of the war. Right now, they’re operating mostly NATO standards, 155 millimeter artillery. This 3 millimeter is very important because it is not compatible between the shells and barrels. Ukraine needs 155 millimeter and the Europeans couldn’t even deliver 1 million artillery shells that they promised, whereas the North Koreans did so within three months. So, one thing I would ask from the South Koreans from Seoul would be artillery ammunition in very large numbers, artillery ammunition. The second thing is military intelligence, military intelligence for doing two things. First, I don’t think the Ukrainian general staff or the Ukrainian War College have a profound understanding on how the North Koreans fight, what their doctrinal order of battle is, obviously for geopolitical reasons.

So, they would need military intelligence assistance from the South Koreans, so they don’t have to do that through on-the-job training on the battlefield at the expense of Ukrainian casualties. And second, right now we are not seeing that at least by open source intelligence, but soon, there will be North Korean personnel, North Korean officers, and if Ukraine is lucky, North Korean generals even coming as prisoners on war. Again, interrogation, harvesting critical intelligence from them would need South Korean assistance that would be helpful for the Ukrainians. And apart from that, anything and everything that pertains to land warfare, steel, ammunition, heavy armor, but again, as I said, predominantly 155 millimeter artillery.

Peter Rough:

Let me follow up then based on Glib’s presentation just now, we are here to mark a hundred days and we’ve gone over, as you did in the correlation of forces where things stand and where we’ve been over the last a hundred days. Where do you anticipate the fight to go over the next 100 days?

Can Kasapoğlu:

Well, as to course, I am afraid to say that I think Ukraine has a job to accomplish. I agree with my colleague that the waterways are natural barriers to restrain follow on forces, especially at the very outset of the conflict, the Ukrainian military showed great prowess in hitting the bridges, pontoon bridges, and beyond these bridges, the Russian reinforcements. This is, I think, an advantage, but the problem is we are not seeing small unit tactics in Kursk, which is standing out from the rest of the Russian combat operations in other parts of Ukraine. We are seeing something that looked like even the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Arab militaries, both in Sinai and Golan, we are seeing tens of Russian armored vehicles approaching to the Ukrainian positions in columns. So far, the Ukrainian combat formations in the area, especially mechanized brigade, the 47th mechanized brigade, the principle of mechanized brigade in the area did well against those large columns.

But we have to keep in mind that the Russians have an abundance of manpower and heavy armor. Although they are not shining, although they are not the best trained, best in shape, they can keep this human wave and steel wave, armor wave attacks onto the Ukrainian positions. Against that concept, the Ukrainians have two problems. One, they are fighting inside the Russian Federation, and there is one major supply route that we can watch by open source intelligence, especially commercial satellite imagery. It goes from Ukraine to the critical hub Sudzha. If the Russians can fire control that supply route, then it’ll be a problem for the Ukrainians because they cannot find workarounds as they are able to do in other parts of Ukraine. The second problem is the Ukrainian armed forces stand at their limits in other fronts right now.

And as Luke rightly pointed out, we are anticipating and the Ukrainian high command is anticipating a large-scale offensive in south. So, if the Ukrainian forces in Kursk are overstretched, I’m afraid the Ukrainian general staff would find little, if any reinforcements, to stabilize the front because there are ways to stabilize the front. You can do it by withdrawing doctrinally. You can do it by manipulating the numbers, sending in reinforcements, or drastically altering your concepts of operations. Apart from withdrawing, the Ukrainian forces may not find any way known by military scientists to stabilize the front and given the enclave that Ukraine is controlling in Kursk right now, there is no large west swaths of territory to retreat. So, I think it hangs in balance.

Peter Rough:

So, John laid out-

Can Kasapoğlu:

I wish I could give more promising news to our Ukrainian brothers and sisters, but let’s hope the best. This is what military science says. Of course, there are unquantifiable variables in military science, and we know the valor and the war-fighting skills and morale and discipline, as Luke pointed out all the Ukrainian military.

Peter Rough:

Of course, we’re a think tank here in Washington. And one of our jobs is to think about how to address some of these challenges and problems. Obviously, we just had a presidential election. There’ll be a new administration sworn into office on January 20th. If your phone rings with the Mar-a-Lago area code from West Palm Beach, Luke Coffey, what do you advise President Trump, Vice President Vance, the national security team that’s being assembled on how to tackle some of these problems that our colleagues from abroad have laid out?

Luke Coffey:

Well, the problem is I never answer calls that aren’t in my phone book already. So, it would be odd if I picked up that call. But if I did pick up that call from Mar-a-Lago, I would remind the President-elect on the need for American strength and how important the perception of American strength is in the world. And whether you like it or not, right now, the strength of the United States will be measured in part by what happens in Ukraine. And actually, I think deep down, the President-elect understands this. And I think that was shown the way he spoke about Ukraine and President Zelensky after their meeting together in New York in September. And the fact that there was a phone call so quickly after President Trump was re-elected within 24 hours.

Peter Rough:

And by all accounts, the call went relatively well.

Luke Coffey:

Yeah, by all accounts, the call went well. By all accounts, the meeting was productive and went really well. So, that’s very encouraging. But I do think President Trump is sincere in that he wants to bring this war to an end. The challenge will be in order to bring it to a just and fair end, the Ukrainians are going to have to get to a position of strength greater than where they are right now. So, if the long-term goal is bringing the war to end, and even President Zelensky himself has said he wants this war to end. Of course, Ukrainians want this war to end. It’s how it ends that matters. But if you want to bring this war to a lasting end that is fair and just for Ukraine, then there are certain steps I think that the new administration, the next administration will have to take. But the first step actually needs to begin now before the next administration even enters the Oval Office. And that is the lame duck Congress needs to pass another major supplemental. I think this will send an important message to Moscow. I think it’ll offer some reassurance to the Ukrainians and I think it will actually strengthen President Trump’s hand after January 20th when he engages with this issue.

The other thing that needs to be done is these nonsensical restrictions that defy the laws of basic military science need to be lifted on the use of American and allied weapons by Ukraine to hit targets inside the Russian Federation. I think as shown by the multiple red lines I haven’t crossed the fears of the Ukrainians using weapons to hit targets inside the Russian Federation, the fear that this would lead to some great escalation I think are unfounded. And I think that if you want to shift the momentum on the battlefield, then Ukraine has to be allowed to use long-range weapons to hit military targets inside Russia.

The next thing that needs to be done is we need to change this drumbeat, this predictable cycle of our assistance and the level of our assistance that has been the case since the beginning of this war. And this is the slow incremental release of certain equipment or material to Ukraine usually after they experience some sort of battlefield setback. So it’s always a day late and a dollar short. Patriot missile is a great example of this. The first HIMARS weren’t agreed to until after Mariupol fell in May of 2022. There are countless examples of how the Ukrainians have to undergo some sort of setback before they unlock the next level of US assistance. We should change the cycle and change the momentum into Ukraine’s favor.

And I think the incoming administration needs to be very bold with the types of weapons we are willing to send. And I think we need to think creatively about this. And then finally, we should continue ahead with arming, equipping, preparing, and training a Ukrainian force that can conduct counter-offensive operations in 2025. And we need to know that we have a part in this in the United States with our partners in Europe. We can provide the equipment, we can provide the training, but ultimately the Ukrainians are going to have to get a handle on their recruitment challenges and figure out the best way to address that within the framework of their existing laws and government.

Peter Rough:

Glib, sitting in Ukraine, what would you advise your government as being priority requests of the United States and of all the Western allies at this moment?

Glib Voloskyi:

I think my colleague correctly mentioned that lifting the restrictions on attacking deep target deep inside Russian territory can make a big difference, especially in the realm of the Kursk operation. This part is often waived away on the pretext that the long-range weapon and the permission to strike the targets inside the Russian territory will not change the course of war, which it won’t per se, but this is definitely part of it because particularly in the context of the Kursk operation, Ukraine given sufficient quantity and given that those provided unexpectedly for Russia and in a brief manner can be really used to disrupt Russian operation even before it started, by attacking stockpile of its weapon, by attacking its fuel storages, by attacking it’s command and center system. So given sufficient quality of missiles, Ukraine can now for a time at least behead the Russian military command on the Kursk direction and leave it without weapon to continue the offensive operation.

Definitely Russia will respond to this by placing its logistical nodes command control center and the aircraft deeper into the area. But such decision will come at a price because the reaction time for aircraft that’s situated deep inside Russia will increase, the number of the flights they can perform will decline. And this means the declining of the firepower of Russia in the battlefield because deploying command and center closer from the front line to preserve their being attacked by attack arms or by Storm Shadow will significantly decrease their situational awareness and ability to control the units and remote logistic nodes will have deteriorate responsiveness to the needs of the front line, basically creating short times shortages for the Russian troops on the front line, breaking their tempo offensive and creating for Ukraine windows opportunity to counterattack. While this will not change the entire course of war, it can help Ukraine to now protect the Kursk Oblast and will definitely improve the situation.

Peter Rough:

Well, thanks. This is ordinarily where I would ask Can Kasapoğlu the same question, but I won’t do that because I want each of you at home to go online and sign up for the Ukraine Military Situation Report, which we affectionately call the UMSR. It comes out weekly at a regular rhythm on Wednesdays and recaps the last week in the war, where things stand, and offers also predictions and insights into the future. Moreover, if you navigate to Hudson.org and Luke Coffey’s expert page, you’ll see a regular drumbeat of products on the war in Ukraine. And again, I’d advertise on the Kursk topic in particular from September, a bit dated, but still very relevant, How to Help Ukraine Succeed in its Kursk Offensive. We are very grateful to have been joined by Glib Voloskyi from the Come Back Alive Initiative Center. You can find him online.

Thanks so much to the three of you for sharing your analysis today. Thanks to all of you for watching for wherever you are, and please stay at Hudson.org for more programming on the war in Ukraine, all things European, and the world writ large. It’s an exciting time of transition and hope you’ll join us in watching it unfold and offering our policy recommendations as we go. Thanks so much.