A Conversation with Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis ahead of the Washington Summit

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Upon taking office as foreign minister of Lithuania in December 2020, Gabrielius Landsbergis quickly made a name for himself as one of Europe’s most effective diplomats. Early in his term, he announced that Lithuania would no longer participate in the Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries (China-CEEC) format; Estonia and Latvia withdrew the following year. Moreover, since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Landsbergis has outspokenly defended Ukrainian sovereignty and denounced Russia’s occupation. In fact, his clarity on the threat Russia poses goes back years. As he put it in June 2024, “I’m Lithuanian, and we strongly disapproved of Russian imperialism before it was common to do so.”

Furthermore, Foreign Minister Landsbergis has time and again made the case for the transatlantic alliance and underscored the importance of a strong American presence in Europe.

Event Transcript

This transcription is automatically generated and edited lightly for accuracy. Please excuse any errors. 

Tomas Janeliūnas:

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, and welcome to the Hudson Institute, whether you are in person or joining us online. My name is Tomas Janeliūnas. I’m a visiting fellow here at Hudson Institute and a professor at Vilnius University in Lithuania. Before we start this discussion, I have a very small announcement about the next intended event. Unfortunately, Moldovan Minister of Foreign Affairs, is not yet here and this event, this discussion is postponed. So have in mind that this is not happening at least today, but still the NATO Summit begins today. Washington DC is vibrant with official and side events, and today’s discussion will focus on the expectations and potential outcomes of the NATO Summit, the current security situation in Ukraine of course, and new challenges Europe is facing, including never seen before increase of diversions and sabotage actions across the Europe. It’s my pleasure to introduce Lithuania’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Gabrielus Landsbergis. He is the second Lithuanian minister in two months, I guess, here at Washington DC to speak here at Hudson Institute, and I’m really excited to welcome just another former student of mine. Just coincidence.

So Mr. Landsbergis, the chairman of Lithuania’s major ruling party, is one of Europe’s most vocal diplomats. He emphasizes relentlessly the importance of standing firm against Russia’s and China’s aggressions. In 2022, Mr. Landsbergis has been named among the most influential diplomats in the European Union by Politico, and he has even been called a dragon slayer for his bold actions in resisting China’s pressure over Taiwan. And of course, since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Landsbergis has outspokenly advocated for military support to Ukraine and the need to counter Russia. So please join me in welcoming Mr. Landsbergis and Peter Rough, senior fellow at Hudson Institute and Director of the Center on Europe and Eurasia. Thank you.

Peter Rough:

Well, I think it speaks volumes about your reputation that despite all the security hassles around the Hudson perimeter, you’ve managed to attract a full house. So welcome to Hudson and everyone’s eager to hear what you have to say.

Gabrielius Landsbergis:

Thank you. It’s a pleasure to be here.

Peter Rough:

Let’s start with the really important questions. What kind of professor is Tomas? Was he a tough grader?

Gabrielius Landsbergis:

I’d say one of the most interesting ones that I had during the university time. So it’s good to have him here and it’s a good memory of the university.

Peter Rough:

Well, you’re usually much more direct describing the CCP and the Russians. That’s a rather ambiguous answer, but let’s move to the Washington Summit since we’re here on the eve of the summit, it’s hard to say what are your impressions. You have yet to really interact with the leadership at the summit, but what are your expectations heading into the Washington Summit some 24 hours before it begins?

Gabrielius Landsbergis:

Well, since we left Vilnius last year, Vilnius Summit, it was clear that we’ll have a summit here in Washington, obviously a celebratory one, 75 years of NATO. And it was clear that we have to make it somehow here in Washington so that the message is not just about the celebration of what we managed to achieve so far. Being on a crossroad because of the war in Europe, because of Russia’s war against Ukraine. It’s not just a crossroad for Europe, it’s not a crossroad for Ukraine, but it’s also for the whole transatlantic community. Therefore, while celebrating 75 years, we need to talk about future, and future is defined by what we do in Ukraine. So I found myself usually talking about this that, look, I am very much eager to raise a glass of champagne and congratulate my colleagues and my country, which is, it’s been 20 years in NATO, safe and secure under the Article 5 umbrella, but also to remind what’s at stake.

That is definitely not a given what we have currently, and that it could be that the biggest battles of NATO are still in the future and it is possible that in rather near future, and we managed to have 75 years of peace, but that piece is being checked right now. So that was the concept that we approached the summit and myself and the team that participates in negotiations, even right now here, just a couple of miles from here, that was a concept to reflect the reality, not just the memory. And Putin is making sure that we do that. Unfortunately with a very brutal against civilian objects, again in Ukraine, this time against a cancer ward hospital, a children’s hospital in Kiev, a very clear message that he feels that he won’t get any answer from us and he can act with impunity. And therefore, we have to make sure that he doesn’t get away with this.

Peter Rough:

In May, you told Christiane Amanpour of CNN that you worry Ukraine may end up being, ”A story of Western failure.” Do you still think that, or do you think that the trajectory might be improving?

Gabrielius Landsbergis:

That Ukraine might be a story of Western failure? Well, it’s very much, I mean, that passage of history has not yet been written, and it could be the biggest success. It could be the strengthening of the transatlantic union, it could be strengthening of Europe, it could be securing of everything that we fought for 75 years, for the 75 years to come, or it could be the failure. So we are still in this Schrodinger’s moment where the cat is both dead and alive. So the history in this is both very bad and very good. It’s still not written.

Peter Rough:

And you say the communique or the negotiations for the summit deliverables are still ongoing at this very moment, despite the late hour. Even though it is still in flux, can you give us a little bit of a taste of what we should expect as a public coming out of the next 24, 48 hours?

Gabrielius Landsbergis:

Well, I think that the mood is a bit different than it was a year ago. A year ago, one might had sensed that we are writing a new passage, at least for NATO and maybe for Ukraine. Now, the expectations are rather lowered, low, meaning that the allies really want to stick to a consensus, avoid any political battle when it comes to negotiations and bring what you could call a clean text that has a bar lowered, but where everybody finds an agreement and can to some level of comfort, we find what we need in that text. So I don’t have a sense of any breakthrough in this, and that means that the breakthroughs, as with the victories, are still in the future.

Peter Rough:

So unity but lowest common denominator essentially?

Gabrielius Landsbergis:

Yeah, this is where we are currently because I don’t believe that any of allied states has a sense of ability to push the line further. Nobody has a sense that this is a crucial moment to do that. So basically it’s better to stay where we’ve been during business, maybe try to amend the text here and there, offering a narrative for the summit rather than a political step.

Peter Rough:

In recent days, there were reports that a Dutch Patriot battery, or system I should say, is being deployed to Lithuania as part of Baltic Connector 24. What is the state of Lithuania’s security right now? Are you feeling confident in deterrence? Are you nervous? How does Lithuania view its own security situation?

Gabrielius Landsbergis:

I mean, there’s several factors in this. So I would divide this into three layers. So first one is, it sounds banal, but it’s true from our perspective, is that Lithuania’s security is being fought for in the trenches in Kharkiv. This is where the outcome of that battle will define our security, how Ukraine manages to win that battle, to push Russia out of the area of territory of Ukraine in a world that’s much more secure and safe. That is clear. If Russians are able to rebuild, act with impunity and basically challenge the remaining order of European security, then we’re in trouble. The second thing is, the second layer would be the whole transatlantic ability to deter. At this stage we still have full trust that we are in alliance that deters first and foremost because it’s able to send a strong enough signal that the answer, you don’t want that answer, that the adversary just doesn’t want that answer, that we’re able to have it with our defense plans, with our defense capabilities, equipment industry and whatnot, that you would not want to test us.

So this is still there. Why I’m saying still because that’s also being tested and definitely Putin fighting Ukraine, he also tests us. Our ability to continue fighting, to continue with our ability to build consensus, to continue to build, to manage democratic processes, which are messy and not so easy. So this, again, we have to keep this in our minds and not lose attention to this detail. And third is what we’re doing nationally. So just to give you a hint. So this year we have a national election later this year in October, and we’ve just approved what is called a National Defense Foundation Fund. Basically, we raised certain taxes in order to get to 3.03 percent of GDP spending towards our defense. We’re procuring additional items, additional pieces of air defense that will be produced, some of them here in United States, some elsewhere. And so imagine the difficulty of the debate. Definitely nobody wants to raise taxes during the election year, but unfortunately we don’t have a privilege of time.

Peter Rough:

Just blame it on the other parties.

Gabrielius Landsbergis:

Yes, well, we blame it on Putin. It’s not just practically easy, but it’s evident that he’s not going to wait until we are the most prepared, until we are in the best possibility to defend. Actually, he will do exactly the opposite. If he has a plan to attack, if he has a plan to test Article 5, he will do that when we’re at our weakest. And the longer we wait, the bigger window of opportunity we present to him.

Peter Rough:

In May I think it was at the informal ministerial in Prague at the doorstep, you made reference to this French proposal that’s been floated at least to put European troops or French troops into Ukraine. And I think you said rather memorably, ”I meant it when I said we believe in Ukrainian victory and Lithuania would be prepared to attach itself for support of such a proposal. ” Is there any update on the French proposal or do you have any predictions of where that style of thinking at least might go?

Gabrielius Landsbergis:

Well, I think the style of thinking is a very needed one, right? Because President Macron, what he suggested is a change in thinking that we do not allow ourselves to talk about really bad scenarios. Somehow we avoid talking about this, but they’re out there. It is a chance that if we don’t step up, if we get tired, if so many things that are happening will continue on happening, Russians just might continue, and then we have to have answers ready of what is next. And this is what President Macron raised. I mean, we will not allow Ukraine to lose, and there are not so many countries that actually said this, and therefore, I personally find it quite easy to join in this. Because if Ukraine loses, my country is next. That’s clear. And therefore, I’m not just talking about Ukraine, I’m talking about myself. My kids, two of them are in the military.

They will have in the reserve, they would have to go to fight for my country. So it’s really personal and it’s not just for me, it’s for the big part of the country. So we need to formulate a winning strategy. Now, what happens practically, so when it comes to us, our statement was that we politically are ready to consider these steps that President Macron suggested. There’s a spectrum of what can happen. The debate was about whether Russians should find NATO troops or French troops in the front. So that wasn’t part of the debate. It was more about the instructors, it was more about assisting with border police and de-mining missions and stuff like that. More of a, what you could call a non-combatant status of assistance that has been previously happening in Ukraine before the war. Think the instructors were in Ukraine. So many others were also in Ukraine.

Peter Rough:

California National Guard, rather famously.

Gabrielius Landsbergis:

So it would be the reestablishment of what was previously happening. I use the example of a couple of things. So at the beginning of the war, almost all of the diplomats left Kiev apart from Vatican and Poland and Japan, if I’m not mistaken. Then we started returning. So basically we returned to what was previously happening. At the beginning, there were no visits because it was not safe for presidents and ministers to go to Kiev. Then we were returned. So the thinking is that instructors could also return, and it’s possible to provide enough security and enough safety with air defense units, with maybe shifting the places of where the instructions are happening and so on and so forth. I mean, it’s possible to plan this and return. It sends a very strong signal. It tells Russians that we’re no longer afraid. We don’t think that you’re setting the rules.

You shouldn’t be setting rules in what we can do in Ukraine. If Ukraine is our partner and if they want this, and if we have the means, it’s up to us to decide. It’s not you who set the rules. So that’s the thinking and we would like to be part of it. And last point in this is obviously democracy steps in and election time in France, which was quite a nail-biting event, I’d call it that. So it’s rather not clear as to what the policy of new government of a new coalition most likely would be, how it would work in tandem with the president where he has a lot of power when it comes to making decisions in defense and foreign policy. So it remains to be seen, but that doesn’t change our position. We are still ready. If the coalition forms, if we have leadership by bigger countries, we’re ready to go along.

Peter Rough:

Let’s go back to Prague, to the ministerial. I happened to be in Prague during that time, and I spoke to at least two foreign ministers on background who described the informal ministerial as focusing heavily on hybrid warfare tactics, which is something that you’re closely associated with. Not practicing them, but calling out Russian use of hybrid warfare in Europe. And I’d like to say that while the Russians have their conventional force committed in Ukraine, they’re using the nuclear level to saber rather and try to deter the west, but also the hybrid unconventional gray zone area to try and muscle out the west to go after it. And as I was told in that ministerial, there was a lot of talk about at what point you’ve crossed an Article 5. When there are arson attacks, when there are buoys removed from rivers, denotating the maritime border, when there is critical infrastructure connecting the Baltics to the Nordic states severed, for example. What’s your take on the status of hybrid warfare and what do you think is going on and where is it heading?

Gabrielius Landsbergis:

Well, first of all, we still call it hybrid for the maybe lack of finding better words. But I think that there is a line where I would personally be unable to call it still something hybrid when it’s clearly a very clear attack. Even publicly I’ve asked this question because there’s public information that certain events, arson events where they happened in my country and in some other neighboring countries, they happened with assistance of Russian special institutions, let’s call it that. And so what is that? Is it something hybrid? For me, it’s a very clear kinetic attack which ended up not harming people by a coincidence, but it wasn’t planned that it shouldn’t harm. So for me, this is a terrorist attack, and the only time that Article 5 was used, it was because of terrorist attack in NATO’s history. So I don’t think that there is a question whether it can happen again or it should happen again. I mean, not the hybrid or terrorist attack, but the answer, the response, obviously it should because it happened. The question is where do you draw the line if one person dies in the arson.

Peter Rough:

Is that where your colleagues are, you think? Fatalities is the red line?

Gabrielius Landsbergis:

Yeah, I mean, I don’t know, but it’s what we are doing and I am personally doing, and I did that in Prague as well. I’m raising these questions because this is the question that Lithuanian public would like to know the answer to, right? So if it’s one person, if it’s five, if it’s 500, where do you say, ”Okay, Russia is behind a terrorist attack in NATO countries, so what do we do about it? ” And there is a bit of sense of reluctance to call a spade a spade because you certainly have to have an answer. So what do you do about it? So what would be your answer? And I see a couple of problems with not having a very clear position on this. First of all, Russia is reading into this as a weakness because I don’t think that they’re currently. . .  They’re basically what they’re doing, they’re probing.

If we burn down a shopping mall in somewhere in Eastern Flank, what happens? Okay, there’s a criminal investigation, but not much else. There’s no multilateral answer, there’s no NATO answer, there’s no European answer. You’re not doing anything. Okay, fine. That means that we can go burn the second one. Maybe we can burn a third one. And for them now with modern technology, with social networks, with Telegram and whatever what they’re using, it’s rather easy to achieve the results that would be shocking for our public and that would influence a political debate. And I think that this is rather grave risk of inviting these events further and maybe even in greater scope. And for us as well, I mean without any answer, we are telling our people that, ”Look, we cannot name, we cannot have an answer. ” And that in turn, the second bad thing is that we might see what I would call a fracturing in decision-making process because the countries of a group or group of countries would be forced to formulate their own strategy towards this sort of events.

What we’ve seen in 2021, when Lithuania first time faced what was called successful, you managed to convince the public and international community that it was a hybrid event. The migration, illegal migration crisis. Well, Belarus instigated waves of migrants to try across the border. At the beginning it was very difficult to formulate an European answer. I’m not even talking about NATO because NATO was never involved in this, but even European answer. So what happens then? You cannot just say, ”Okay, so NATO is not doing anything, so we’re not doing anything. ” You have to do something right because of your public demands, right? We’re seeing that there are tens of thousands of people on the other side of the border and each and every hour a couple of hundred are being pushed through to our borders. So what are you going to do? So you have to formulate your own own policy.

What happened later? So we formulated, then we implemented it together with Poland and Latvia because this was the first three countries who were facing the threat. And slowly, slowly it became some sort of a regional and European that you could start calling policy. Exactly the same things would happen with current Russia’s approach. You would see a country formulating its own strategy outside NATO, which is not healthy. Therefore, I would imagine that it’s way better to really to talk this out, formulate the strategy, announce things that you can announce so that Russians know that there will be an answer and we’re really having our hands full with preparation to this and having a united answer. That is what a healthy alliance would do.

Peter Rough:

So throw some elbows inside the family to try to encourage a little more forward leaning posture, but publicly take a unified position?

Gabrielius Landsbergis:

Yeah, exactly.

Peter Rough:

That’s the Landsbergis doctrine, so to speak. Okay. Well, Lithuania strikes me as being particularly vulnerable to hybrid techniques. Given the large numbers of refugees you’ve taken on board, do you think that your country has a handle on who all is in your country? This is a topic that comes up a lot in the United States on account of the migration wave at the border.

Gabrielius Landsbergis:

Those who crossed in?

Peter Rough:

Well, I’m sure that some of the Russians and others that have fled to Lithuania came for true fear of the war and fleeing, but I can imagine that those security institutions, as you called them, saw this as an opportunity also to potentially bring in their own people into Vilnius and the rest of Lithuania.

Gabrielius Landsbergis:

I see two dimensions to this question. So first of all, when it comes to resilience to hybrid events, countries like mine in many cases are better prepared than some of our even bigger allies. The reason is that we’ve been under hybrid threat for decades. Not just under threat, but basically under hybrid events, or you might call them that. Our first influence into our electoral processes was noticed in 2000s when nobody was even talking about this. We were just 10 years into our independence, and then we suddenly see political parties being financed from somewhere strange sources. So we started building up our resilience decades before it became what you would call cool in other countries. So now if you want to look what worked when it comes to resilience towards electoral interference, energy independence, and so many other things, you would look into the Baltic countries, Lithuania, of the region itself, and you would find good examples as what worked, what doesn’t work.

The second point is that you’re right, obviously Lithuania has been chosen and many countries in the region as a country to stay and hide either from war or from oppression in Belarus, in Russia and so on and so forth. Not just for economic reasons, but because we’re politically free and you can stay and live a comfortable life in our countries. When it comes to hybrid activities of Russia, the way that they are recruiting people, they do target these group of people who tend to live in Lithuania and other countries in the region, but that’s not always, and not necessarily just the people who are targeted. It could be basically anybody. It could be a person out of luck. It could be a person just looking for a quick Euro or that is paid by cryptocurrency if you do some work that has been asked by somebody through the Telegram channel. Yeah, it could be a refugee from Belarus, it could be a refugee from Ukraine.

It could be basically, and it could be also as I mentioned, Lithuanian. So certain people could be vulnerable more than others, but that does not immediately mean that it’s just these groups who are vulnerable. But in any case, the biggest problem here is that trying to secure the ways how this influence seeps in is a game of whack-a-mole. Basically closing one loop, one loophole, there’s another one opening. Therefore, you have to start by sending a signal to the source. If you do this, the answer will be such. Because if we’re just closing down the leaks, that’s all that we’re going to do.

Peter Rough:

Yeah, dynamic deterrence and then free and open societies can’t just play defense on these issues.

Gabrielius Landsbergis:

Exactly.

Peter Rough:

To establish an equilibrium. Last time I was in Lithuania, I was told that the border between Kaliningrad and Lithuania was relatively stable, in part because the Russians don’t want to jeopardize their rail links from outside of Lithuania through Lithuania into Kaliningrad. Is that still true? And secondly, if I could add to that question, what is the general military balance in Kaliningrad? Are they still heavily invested in Ukraine, much of their units were emptied out in equipment, or are they beginning to reconstitute some of their forces in Kaliningrad?

Gabrielius Landsbergis:

So first of all, the border is rather stable. I don’t think that they have an interest, as you say, in being stable. They’re getting most of the goods that they need and require through the rail link. People can travel, Russians can travel with a easier visa regime, let’s call that, through Lithuania territory to Kaliningrad. So I think that they prefer the status quo currently. We have more problems on the Belarusian border, which is for us rather a difficult one. When it comes to Finland, well, they have a lot of issues with the Russian border. They manage it just basically by closing it down completely. And in that way they manage the situation currently. Your second question was?

Peter Rough:

Just the state of military balance, whether or not Kaliningrad is emptied out?

Gabrielius Landsbergis:

So as much information as I can provide, obviously almost everything that they have, starting from Kaliningrad all the way to the Far East has been or is in the process of being sent to Ukraine. But that shouldn’t give us a false hope that, ”Oh, look, everything is empty, Russia is vulnerable, ” or whatever, and that we can take it for granted. So that’s definitely not a fact. The factories are running, they’re rebuilding, they’re hiring new people, they’re refurbishing the military bases that they have. And so we cannot give into this false hope that somehow Russia has been crippled by this war. They are in a difficult situation, obviously fighting in Ukraine, a war that they have not expected at the beginning. But when you put a country like Russia on it, the whole economy on the war footing, one has to take this seriously.

Peter Rough:

And of course it’s backstopped by its partners, China in the Far East, Iran in the Middle East, and Northeast Asia and DPRK, which raises the question of how Europe is handling Iran, North Korea and China. Maybe let’s just begin with Iran. I don’t detect it being a significant part of the agenda in all the conversations I’ve had in the lead-up to the next 48 hours. Is there been a paradigm shift or has there been a paradigm shift in Europe on Iran as there has been on Russia? Are Europeans sufficiently alive to the problems that Iran is posing, that its drones and ballistic missiles are attacking the eastern flank of NATO essentially in Ukraine? Do we need a shift on Iran still or where does that stand?

Gabrielius Landsbergis:

I wouldn’t probably call it a paradigm shift, but there was movement. That’s a fact. We have Iranian companies that are sanctioned. We have additionally, meaning during just the war. We have components that are being used, European Western components that are used in drone production that are being banned from being shipped to Iran, which is already a change. So I would say that the debate has started, which is a cautious one. From my perspective, if you would be talking about the paradigm shift, then basically then you called an alliance because it is what it is. It is an alliance. They’re helping each other avoid sanctions, technology transfers, military transfers, whatnot. And then you treat it like one. Like an adversary, the whole bunch. So we’re not there yet. We see differences of approach, especially when it comes to China. That’s definitely a very different case for Europeans, a very difficult case to approach. And again, I mean the timidity allows opportunity for an adversary.

Peter Rough:

Let me ask one or two more questions, and then if we have microphones, we’ll allow these brave people who have worked their way past Capital security to ask the minister a question or two.

Gabrielius Landsbergis:

Sure.

Peter Rough:

And let’s just go to China next then. The next supporter of Russia, and of course in a different order of magnitude altogether, then Iran. They have not supplied direct weaponry in the same way that Iran has, but as Secretary Blinken and others never hesitate to point out from microelectronics to machine tools, they’ve been essential to the Russian reconstitution and even just maintaining the Russian war effort altogether. The Europeans and the Americans have said a red line is just what the Iranians are doing, actual weaponry to Russia. And they haven’t touched the dual use items, but I detect a slight shift there.

Are we nearing the point where Europe and the United States will go to China and say, ”If you continue providing dual use components that are so important to Russia for this war effort, it will jeopardize fundamentally your relationship with us, ” or is it, which is kind of where I think it still sits, one issue amongst many in the files that we have with China? So we go to Beijing or Beijing comes to us and we say, ”This is a problem. You shouldn’t do this. Next let’s talk about automobile trade or next, let’s talk about tariffs, ” or whatever it might be?

Gabrielius Landsbergis:

Well, I think that it’s strategically, we still have not yet decided of where we would like our relationship with China go further. From my perspective, again, I see that we are entangled in the very similar relationship that we had with Russia, just instead of natural resources, there are other spheres we are entangled in. That means that it doesn’t allow us to take a very clear position. Where do we want this to lead? So definitely currently, this is a question among others. We raise this issue, we raise Ukraine, and then we talk about, as you mentioned-

Peter Rough:

Climate change.

Gabrielius Landsbergis:

Yeah. So from my perspective, it allows China much a lot of room to maneuver because there is no clear sense as what will happen if we do this further. So I think that they’re still rather comfortable in this, and I think it’s wrong. It assists Russia obviously in its war, but mostly assists China for them to grow their strength in military, to find a way how to avoid sanctions, to find a way how to avoid this European or Western annoyance, let’s say about them, and still be able to be a real kingmaker in this conflict and possibly in any other that they would entertain being part of.

Peter Rough:

What are we going to say about or read about China and communicate or declaration, whatever it is, coming out of the NATO Summit?

Gabrielius Landsbergis:

It’s still being under negotiation, but I think that we will find a rather strong text, which is a new thing, or rather a change from last year.

Peter Rough:

Oh, an improvement.

Gabrielius Landsbergis:

Yeah, improvement.

Peter Rough:

Okay, great. Well, I’d love to go to the audience for a question or two if you have it, and we can go to the gentleman in the back. And if you could just wait one minute, we’ll pass you a microphone. Please introduce yourself as well.

Alexey Gorbachev:

Thank you. I’m Alexey Gorbachev, I’m with the Voice of America. I have a question. In the beginning you said that major NATO battles are in the future. Could you elaborate on that in terms of what is the probability of direct conflict between NATO and Russia in the next five years? What is your projection?

Peter Rough:

Was that for me or for the minister? Just kidding.

Alexey Gorbachev:

For both of you.

Peter Rough:

Yes, if you’d like to take that.

Gabrielius Landsbergis:

Sure.

Peter Rough:

Thank you.

Gabrielius Landsbergis:

Well, I’ve covered a little bit about this in my initial answering, first couple of initial questions. Basically, when we say that the future of Europe is decided in Ukraine, what do we mean by this? If Ukraine is unable to win and Russia has not lost, that will provide Russia a lot of possibility to regrow what they’re even doing right now, learn lessons, which they’re doing currently, and use the lessons and use the new military resources that they have and they will have built up during the couple of years in the future, to use it against NATO. And this is where the most crucial point stands. Do we offer a deterrent enough that Russians would know that this should not be tried? If we don’t, by political inaction, by military inaction, by inability to build up that. . .  One thing is to have the military plans.

The second thing is to fill those plans up with a military force. If we do not send the signal in these directions, this is where the most dangerous time can come from. Where even a thought, even a word, a sentence that NATO is not sure whether we would be able to defend every single member equally would sound as an invitation to Putin. And I think that honestly, I mean it has been said by many Western leaders and thinkers and whatnot that the next three to five years might be rather dangerous, yes, for NATO, because we are picking up and they are building it right now.

When we’re talking numbers in Europe for us, so we had a lengthy conversation with our German partners. Now they had made a decision that you start a decision to send a brigade to Lithuania that will be permanently stationed in Lithuania. That’s 5,000 troops. And it’s not an easy discussion politically for them. It is a difficult one. Politically for us, it’s also a rather expensive thing where we’ll be spending a lot of money just to be able to accept 5,000 troops. Now, when we’re talking about Ukrainian army, we’re talking what? 400, 500,000 troops? When we’re talking Russian Army, it’s a million, 1.2 million troops. So we have to be sure that when we’re talking about NATO’s ability, we’re measuring up.

Peter Rough:

Tomas’s other student had nice things to say about the German brigade coming to Lithuania. On that point though, any major war in the Baltics would one way or another include Belarus the way it has been involved also in the Ukraine context. Who is Alexander Lukashenko? Is he someone chafing under Putin’s thumb? Is he somebody who’s a wholly owned subsidiary? Is he looking for independence? How are we to think about Belarus?

Gabrielius Landsbergis:

For us, it is a rather dangerous neighbor to have because as you rightfully mentioned, I mean any. . .  Well, at this stage, it’s completely hypothetical. It has to be clear. Any attack on NATO in the region, in our region would happen through Belarus. There’s no other way around, just plain geography. So we have to keep this in mind. Lukashenko himself, he wanted to maintain his own private security, prosperity, whatever that is, and lost his country in turn. So he’s there, but his country is barely there. The biggest hope for Belarus comes from Belarusian people. And throughout my term, in these four years, I’ve tried really to push this point through. 600,000 people coming out in the streets of Minsk. That’s a lot. We haven’t seen that in Russia. We haven’t seen that anywhere in the countries like Russia. So that tells you something about the spirit of the people. And it’s different. They long for freedom. They long for dignity. They long for, I would say democracy, because they came out because of the stolen election. And I have the belief that this spirit is there.

Peter Rough:

Hasn’t been extinguished, ultimately.

Gabrielius Landsbergis:

No, it hasn’t been. And therefore we have to support this. We have to be there for them. One day they will call for us and we have to be ready.

Peter Rough:

How can I ask for another question after that ending? It’s a lovely ending. I’ll ask a final question. What are you going to tell Secretary Blinken when you see him? What does a Lithuanian ask of the United States, or what message do you want to convey, just between us?

Gabrielius Landsbergis:

Yeah, it’s good that it’s off the record.

Peter Rough:

Camera’s in the wall and the ceiling. You can barely see.

Gabrielius Landsbergis:

Now, honestly, I mean the importance, and it’s not trying to convince the current administration. I think that they’ve been excellent in this. But in general, as you know, a conduit to the people of United States is that to once again reiterate the importance of United States in Europe. This bond, this connection that helped us build Europe, that helped us rebuild our country. And when you visited Vilnius, it’s a lovely city, it’s a lovely country, and it’s lovely today because it has NATO it. We have EU, we’re part of it. We’re safe, we’re secure, and we’re prosperous because of this umbrella, and we’ll do our part in this. I mentioned 3 percent. We’re giving all we can to Ukraine for their war effort, and we’ll continue to do that. So the main message is that we need you. We’ll not be free riders. We will try to do what we can and we’ll try to convince others to do the same.

Peter Rough:

Will there be a new defense pledge at the Washington Summit at perhaps 2.5 percent or higher?

Gabrielius Landsbergis:

I’m not too optimistic.

Peter Rough:

Okay. Well, I think we know now after that 45 minutes, why Politico, as Tomas mentioned, coronated you one of the great foreign ministers of Europe. It’s really been a fascinating conversation. Thanks for your openness. Thanks for coming back again to Hudson Institute. That’s twice we’ve managed to have you this year. It’s a real pleasure. And good luck with the negotiations and the summit meeting in the next 48 hours. For those of you watching at home, please stay at Hudson.org for more programming. Unfortunately, as just mentioned, the Moldovan Foreign Minister isn’t going to be available to make it today, but we’ll have more for you at Hudson.org soon. Thanks so much for joining us, and thanks to all of you for coming here in person today. Thank you.