A persistent theme on the margins of the recent NATO summit in Washington was professed worries over the potential reelection of former President Donald Trump.
The producers of a NATO video shown at the summit’s public events clearly hoped to erase him: It featured clips of U.S. presidents Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, Barack Obama and Joe Biden — three times. And yet, there wasn’t a single clip of the former American president who may well take office again soon.
And while it’s very encouraging that several European leaders reached out to Trump in the aftermath of the assassination attempt, much of Europe remains in need of a different policy psychology when it comes to a possible second Trump term.
Rather than simply sending out panicked warnings — for example, an EU official was recently quoted as saying how a second Trump presidency was “set to be just like 2016, but at the same time, so much worse” — imagine, for a moment, if some European leaders and commentators rebooted and adopted a more constructive approach. Imagine starting with the outlook that Trump could be someone they could work with, and putting in a little more effort to craft productive proposals for cooperation — beginning with areas of commonality.
An effective approach might start with acknowledging that Trump was right in 2019, when he imposed sanctions on any firm helping Russia’s Gazprom finish the Nord Stream II natural gas pipeline into the EU. His argument was that it would deprive Ukraine of substantial transit revenues and increase its vulnerability to Russian aggression, as well as provide Moscow with coercive power over Europe’s economy and generate huge new revenues for the Kremlin.
European leaders could then move on to discuss how to shift toward more realistic and market-based energy policies in order to advance security — and encourage growth — while reducing man-made carbon emissions. Discussions that might begin by welcoming Trump’s commitment — in contrast to Biden — of increasing LNG exports to Europe.
Europe’s leaders might also acknowledge the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) recent criticism of their “two historic monumental mistakes” in energy policy: their reliance on Russian gas and turning away from nuclear power. And subsequently, they could collegially work with a future Trump administration on a new “master plan” to address this matter, as the IEA said would be needed.
Next, imagine a conversation about the common problem of China’s unfair trade practices, which took over international conversation during Trump’s first presidential campaign, and was later highlighted in his 2017 National Security Strategy.
Trump had made the point that China was distorting markets to gain economic advantages and build up hard currency, which could be used to undermine the liberal international order. And since then, the problem has only grown worse. China’s economic aggression — including dumping goods at artificially low prices — is harming European industries, from automotive companies to plastics producers. Moreover, there’s still significant work to be done to improve the resilience of supply chains, so that Europeans and Americans are no longer dependent on China for critical goods — especially for components of military systems.
A consensus on the need for re-shoring, near-shoring and friend-shoring is now growing across the U.S. political spectrum. And we must urgently discuss how to achieve this with our European allies.
Similarly, when it comes to defense, Europe could come to the table with serious discussions on how to boost the capabilities it needs to restore the balance of power in Europe and deter Russia. It could also recognize that Trump was right in calling for NATO members to meet their pledge of spending 2 percent of GDP on defense.
All parties now recognize the need for a buildup — not only of NATO forces but also of American and European defense industrial bases. And along these lines, Europe could propose potential solutions for how allies could continue to do more, including how to address the problem of manpower shortages and fulfilling critical combat support requirements.
Finally, allies could work toward persuading Germany to reverse its opposition to joint European borrowing in order to finance critical military supplies.
Of course, stories about U.S. allies expressing anxiety about Trump’s return and discussing ways to “Trump-proof” NATO will be prevalent in the months ahead. But the fact is, no matter who wins the U.S. presidency, Trump represents about half of the American electorate. A little more reflection and a little less contempt might go a long way toward creating the kind of enduring transatlantic consensus that’s required if democracies like ours are to prevail in the geopolitical competition we face.
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