Kenneth Weinstein was interviewed by Naoya Yoshino.
Q: How did it come about that Prime Minister Ishiba contributed an article about security policy to the Hudson Institute?
A: We asked all of the candidates running for the presidency of the Liberal Democratic Party to contribute articles. We received contributions from Taro Kono, Katsunobu Kato and Shigeru Ishiba. We didn't hear from the other six. We wanted to shine a spotlight on the similarities and differences between the candidates.
Q: Ishiba has discussed forming an Asia version of NATO. Is that feasible?
A: I think the idea is worth considering for the long term, but in the short to medium term, it's way too complex to move forward.
First, Japan's constitution wouldn't allow for the kind of mutual self-defense that an Asian NATO would require.
Second, I think certain Asian nations prioritize certain contingencies over others. South Korea is more concerned about a North Korea contingency than it is a China contingency. There are nations in Southeast Asia that are dependent on China economically and don't want to upset it.
The Philippines, Japan and Australia arguably have the closest visions of what a mutual defense treaty might entail. But beyond that, it's hard to imagine right now.
Q: Does the future of an Asian NATO depend on China's response to the idea?
A: I think China's own behavior will determine the future of an Asian NATO. If enough countries in the Indo-Pacific feel threatened by China, then the likelihood of an Asian NATO increases.
Russia puts pressure on NATO countries to prevent united NATO action. There is also the possibility that China has leverage over some of the potential members of an Asian NATO.
Q: Ishiba has also discussed revisions to the Status of Forces Agreement, the legal basis for keeping U.S. troops in Japan.
A: The U.S.-Japan alliance is strong, it's deep, it's broad, and it's a major priority for both governments. So, the notion that an article calling to revise the Status of Forces Agreement is going to shake the alliance is overblown.
I think at some point it's worth revising the Status of Forces Agreement as Japan becomes more of a peer to the United States and takes its own defense into its own hands. We're just not there yet.
Q: If Trump wins the election, will there be any differences toward Japan and Asia compared with his first term?
A: I'm not expecting major differences. I think that President Trump signed on to the "free and open Indo-Pacific" that Prime Minister [Shinzo] Abe presented to him as a counter to China's Belt and Road policy. There was the revival of the [Australia-India-Japan-U.S.] Quad. I think these would continue if there was a second Trump term.
I think President Trump and his team were grateful for Japan's proactive contribution to peace. And Prime Minister Ishiba is someone who, like President Trump, stands against the conventional wisdom, sides with the people against the elites. I think they'll have a good relationship.
Q: Would a second Trump administration emphasize multilateral alliances and security policy like those under Biden?
A: Yes. There would have been a strong U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral under President Trump [if he had won the 2020 election.] On AUKUS, it's a different story. What's clear is that the ambitions of AUKUS exceed the capabilities of the U.S. to build nuclear submarines right now. The monies aren't there, so we'll have to see how it shakes out.
Q: You were nominated by Trump in 2020 to be the ambassador to Japan, but the nomination lapsed. Would you like that role in a second Trump administration?
A: I love Japan. I have had a lot of experience there. I would be honored to serve, but that's not up to me. It'd be an immense honor in whatever position I was offered in the U.S. government under President Trump, were I offered a position.
Q: You seem optimistic about U.S. alliance relationships under a second Trump administration.
A: I think Asia is different from Europe. I think that there's been a fundamental cultural shift in Japan from the decades of a pacifist strategic culture to a strategic culture now that recognizes the critical importance of the armed forces to Japan and Japan's own role on its own defense.
That's not to say that President Trump would be happy with everything Japan does, or South Korea does. But I think the Japanese are much more willing to pay their fair share than are the Germans or other European allies.