U.S. President-elect Donald Trump’s desire to end Russia’s war against Ukraine is sincere. But it is understandable that Ukraine and its supporters may have concerns about how, exactly, the “deal” promised by Trump during his campaign will look. If it does not include ways to guarantee Ukraine’s ability to defend itself, the fighting may only stop temporarily; history shows that Russia will return in a few years to finish what it started. The war would not truly end—it would merely be frozen.
But these same supporters of Ukraine must also be honest and recognize that a Harris administration would have posed its own challenges, albeit for different reasons. Vice President Kamala Harris would likely have continued President Joe Biden’s tepid policy of doing just enough to help Ukraine to survive but never enough to succeed.
Long delays in providing key weapon systems, the illogical restrictions placed on those systems, and the slow drip of aid far short of what Biden had the legal authority to deliver have caused immense frustration among Ukrainians. These policies often seem to defy basic principles of military strategy and practice. As Ukraine endures daily attacks from Russian missiles, North Korean artillery, and Iranian drones—and with more than 10,000 North Korean soldiers now deployed on the Russian side—many Ukrainians see the Biden team’s self-imposed limits to military aid as an open invitation to the Kremlin to keep escalating its brutal war.
There is no doubt that Ukrainians are grateful for the support provided by Biden’s White House; in the early days of the war, it saved their country. But as the fighting went on, U.S. aid became a day late and a dollar short thanks to the dithering and indecisiveness coming from the Biden team. There are many Ukrainians who will be happy to see the backside of U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, who is thought to be the main culprit in the slow-rolling and limiting of aid.
Harris never indicated that her approach would have differed from Biden’s. This is why Ukrainian politicians, policymakers, and commentators are now keeping an open mind about Trump. They view a Trump reelection as a gamble—but one they are willing to take.
For those worried about Trump’s next steps, it helps to take a deep breath and stay calm. Reports from the September meeting between Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky were positive. And within 24 hours of Trump’s election victory on Nov. 5, the two leaders had a phone conversation that Zelensky described as constructive. What’s more, a knee-jerk reaction on Ukraine from Trump is unlikely. While he repeatedly boasted on the campaign trail that he could resolve the war in 24 hours even before he officially took office, we know by now that this is classic Trump bluster.
Russia’s war against Ukraine will be one of the top foreign-policy challenges for a second Trump administration, alongside managing relations with China and deterring Iran in the Middle East. To predict how Trump might approach the Russia-Ukraine conflict, we can examine his handling of major foreign-policy issues during his first term. For example, Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal—the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—was a key campaign promise in 2016. Once in office, however, he did not rush to immediately exit the deal.
Instead, a policy review and phased approach that spanned 16 months took place before Trump left the JCPOA. It was not until October 2017 that Trump first decertified Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA, and it took until May 2018—one-third of the way into his first term—to formally exit the deal. Moreover, when Trump did finally leave the JCPOA, his administration had a policy ready to implement: the so-called “maximum pressure” campaign. You might not have agreed with his decision to exit the deal or the campaign that followed, but no one can argue that these were truly impulsive moves that left a policy vacuum.
Given the political stakes surrounding Ukraine—and Trump’s desire to be seen winning and projecting strength—it’s unlikely he will want to appear weak or easily manipulated by Russian President Vladimir Putin. A loss of Ukraine to Russia would be seen at home and abroad as a defeat for the United States and Trump by extension. This suggests that he will adopt a measured and deliberate approach when shaping his Ukraine policy, just like his team did regarding the JPCOA.
What’s more, Russia is now in closer alignment with North Korea, Iran, and China than during Trump’s first term, suggesting that he might not be as positively predisposed to Putin as he was previously. Also, judging by Putin’s track record on negotiating in good faith, it is likely that any talks over Ukraine will reach a dead end and break down. At this point, Trump may choose to walk away from the table like he did with North Korea in 2019. Another interesting difference from the Biden administration that could become useful for Ukraine is energy policy; Trump’s promises to unshackle U.S. oil and gas production, together with his family’s personal relationships with the Gulf states, may give him the additional leverage of sinking global energy prices and cutting one of Russia’s remaining economic lifelines.
Ukrainians, too, want this brutal war to end. But a just and durable peace can only be achieved if Ukraine feels secure enough to accept the terms. It seems that Trump understands this. After his meeting with Zelensky in September, he said, “We both want to see this end, and we both want to see a fair deal made.” To date, the only credible basis for peace that’s currently on the table is Zelensky’s 10-point formula.
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