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Prioritizing Human Rights in United States Policy toward China: A Guide for the Trump Administration

Olivia Enos
Olivia Enos
Senior Fellow
Anouk Wear
Anouk Wear
Policy Advisor, Hong Kong Watch
Sophie Richardson
Sophie Richardson
Co–Executive Director, Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD)
A police officer gestures in front of a propaganda billboard urging "the maintenance of rule of law in Xinjiang" in both Chinese and Uyghur languages in China's northwestern Xinjiang region on July 19, 2023. (Pedro Pardo/AFP via Getty Images)
Caption
A police officer gestures in front of a propaganda billboard urging "the maintenance of rule of law in Xinjiang" in both Chinese and Uyghur languages in China's northwestern Xinjiang region on July 19, 2023. (Pedro Pardo/AFP via Getty Images)

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Introduction

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) poses interrelated threats to the United States’ national security, economic interests, and human rights. But for decades, policymakers have elevated national security and economic interests over human rights. This has led to worse outcomes in all three areas, particularly for people across China. The Trump administration should devise a strategy that addresses these challenges in tandem, as the safeguarding of human rights will be central to any effective strategy to counter the CCP.

The party’s grip on power is premised on denying 1.4 billion people their human rights. Over the past decade, the CCP has committed genocide and crimes against humanity against Uyghur Muslims, dismantled freedom and human rights in Hong Kong, Macau, and Southern Mongolia, sought to erase Tibet’s culture and language, persecuted Christians, cracked down on freedom of religion or belief for people of all faith traditions, and targeted human rights defenders and dissidents. The CCP increasingly commits abuses beyond its borders and undermines international human rights by actively undermining sovereignty in myriad ways, including through transnational repression. Beijing also continues to undermine the strength of international institutions, including the United Nations, to rewrite the rules of international order in China’s favor. These offenses are inextricably linked to China’s refusal to cooperate with the international community during the COVID-19 pandemic and the CCP’s contribution to the fentanyl epidemic, which have played a part in millions of deaths worldwide.

If the new administration, in concert with allies, does not tackle the CCP threat to human rights, the security, economic, and human rights consequences will be grave. Xi Jinping’s government has the resources and ambition to fundamentally reshape the global order. A failure to adequately respond to the CCP’s human rights abuses could compromise the post–World War II human rights system, call into question democracies’ ability to resolve conflicts peacefully, and threaten broader US interests.

US policymakers should (1) hold accountable the individuals and entities in China who have perpetrated human rights violations, (2) provide support for human rights defenders and dissidents from China, (3) advocate for and provide relief to political prisoners, (4) develop proactive responses to CCP atrocity crimes, (5) extend refugee status and asylum to individuals fleeing persecution, and (6) develop a constructive response to transnational repression.

China’s Recent Human Rights Record

Under Xi’s leadership, the CCP’s threats to human rights and freedom, both within and beyond China’s borders, have intensified. Currently, the CCP is:

  • Carrying out atrocities that the US government has determined constitute genocide and crimes against humanity against Uyghur Muslims. Today, more than one million Uyghurs are held in various forms of arbitrary detention, including political reeducation camps. An estimated three million Uyghurs work in some form of state-sponsored forced labor. And the CCP is subjecting Uyghur women of child-bearing age to forced abortion and sterilization on a massive scale.
  • Undermining civil and political liberties in Hong Kong. Millions of Hong Kongers took to the streets in 2019 to peacefully protest for democracy and against Beijing’s proposed extradition bill. Since then, the CCP has taken more than 1,900 individuals as political prisoners.1 Many of them are still behind bars, including well-known figures like Joshua Wong, Gwyneth Ho, and Jimmy Lai. The party’s repression has forced pro-democracy news outlets like Stand News and Apple Daily to shutter. And the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance, or Article 23, increased jail times and criminalized more forms of free expression.
  • Heightening persecution against Tibetans. The CCP seeks to erase Tibetan culture, language, and religious practice. Reports state that the party (1) subjects Tibetans to forced labor, indoctrination, and reeducation, (2) strips Tibetans of their land and water rights, and (3) forcibly assimilates Tibetan children in state-run boarding schools. In 1995, the CCP forcibly disappeared the Panchen Lama, the second most important figure in Tibetan Buddhism after the Dalai Lama. The CCP has indicated that it intends to control the succession of the current Dalai Lama. Finally, Beijing’s economic development policies pose a grave threat to Tibet’s environment and water supply.
  • Committing transnational repression, including in the US. Some of the more egregious examples include (1) bounties issued by the Hong Kong government against pro-democracy advocates in the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada, (2) physical violence against peaceful protestors supporting freedom in Tibet and Hong Kong during Xi’s 2023 visit to San Francisco, and (3) the establishment of over 100 overseas Chinese police stations in 52 countries, including in the US.

Why Human Rights Matter in US Policy toward China

There are many reasons why the US and the international community need to counter the CCP’s continued erosion of human rights. US interests in China would be better served if the CCP was a transparent regime that upheld the rule of law at home and globally—not one that shuts its population off from global information flows, arbitrarily targets commercial actors, and regularly flouts international law. Below are three reasons human rights matter to US foreign policy toward China:

1.   Improving human rights in China empowers people to challenge an unaccountable regime. Previous US administrations have insufficiently recognized how human rights abuses help the party remain in power. Just as the CCP uses national security and economic threats to increase its global influence, it undermines human rights to quell dissent and shore up its domestic power. Failing to counter the CCP’s human rights abuses leaves valuable diplomatic leverage on the table.

2.  Democracies should lead in countering the CCP’s threats to rights. The CCP’s activities threaten human rights inside and outside China. Democracies need to lead in countering this threat. The US should work with like-minded allies and partners to develop effective mechanisms to hold the CCP accountable for its rights violations and ensure protections for the party’s targets. Washington will need to manage international institutions and civil society effectively to stave off the CCP’s malign influence as Beijing seeks to weaken the international system.

3.  People across China deserve the US’s best defense. The CCP’s human rights violations leave people across China without representation, and those who stand up against injustice pay enormous costs. People across China who work for democracy and human rights need acknowledgment and support from the US and the international community. Without accountability for perpetrators and aid for human rights defenders (in the form of technical assistance, aid to refugees and asylum seekers, and financial support), progress will be elusive. The CCP will strive to disempower the people taking risks to secure the gains the US says it wants to see. Washington should do more to support and defend the human rights the CCP assiduously denies.

A Strategy to Combat Human Rights Abuses in China

Future strategies to counter the CCP are unlikely to succeed if they do not account for human rights. And it is imperative that all US administrations, as well as allies and partners, robustly fulfill their own commitments to uphold their human rights obligations as set out under binding international law. A failure to do so enables and emboldens Beijing. Any US effort to counter the CCP should also seek to hold the party accountable and honor, in word and deed, the dignity of the people across and from China whom the US seeks to defend.

Below are six principles the new administration and Congress should consider as they develop policy and a strategy to counter the CCP’s domestic and international human rights violations.

1.    Make better use of legal, financial, and reputational tools to impose consequences on individuals and entities responsible for undermining human rights.

  1. Strategically deploy sanctions. Officials should use existing sanctions tools to create diplomatic leverage and increase consequences for CCP officials and entities responsible for violations. To that end, the US should make full use of its ample sanctions authorities to target entities and individuals responsible for human rights violations and fully enforce preexisting sanctions.2 Sanctions should target Chinese banks responsible for financing the CCP’s abuses and engaging in illegal activities including forced labor, sanctions evasion, and money laundering.
  2. Ensure the reauthorization of preexisting authorities. Congress should ensure that sanctions authorities do not lapse.
  3. Consider authorizing the use of secondary sanctions for human rights abuses in China. Congress should authorize secondary sanctions authorities to hold those aiding and abetting the CCP accountable for their roles in human rights violations, especially over Uyghur forced labor. Additionally, the administration should put the Ministry of Public Security’s Institute of Forensic Science back on the entity list, as it has not changed the conduct for which it was first designated.
  4. Use all other available tools. Beyond sanctions, the US should use other financial tools designed to tackle illegal activities like forced labor and other forms of human trafficking, money laundering, and sanctions evasion, including by:
    1. Strengthening implementation and enforcement of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA). US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) should use all existing authorities to issue penalties and fines for repeat violators of UFLPA, fully implement the new de minimis regulations, and urge Congress to pass additional legislation to hold exploiters of the de minimis exception accountable. This would help prevent goods suspected of being produced with Uyghur forced labor from being reexported to other markets. Unfortunately, CBP and other agencies tasked with UFLPA implementation remain under-resourced. Congress should consider providing additional funding for staff, enforcement, and technical training, including language skills. The US should also coordinate further with allies and partners to mitigate Uyghur enslavement.
    2. Making full use of the Treasury Department’s special measures, including a primary money laundering concern (PMLC) designation. The Treasury Department should consider whether certain entities in Hong Kong qualify as PMLCs. It should also explore measures short of a PMLC designation to signal to businesses the risk of operating in Hong Kong. Either course would send a clear warning to the business community about degradations in Hong Kong’s legal and judicial system and the island’s emerging role as a sanctions evasion and money laundering hub.

2. Strengthen support for human rights defenders across and from China.

  • Recognize the sacrifices of human rights defenders. Opponents of the CCP stand up for human rights at great personal cost. Their bravery should not only be commended, but also wholeheartedly supported through public recognition and material support.
  • Establish contact. Whenever and wherever possible, including in China, US officials should establish and maintain contact with activists. These individuals and organizations have endured escalating repression under Xi but continue to advocate for legal reform, better access to education and public health, and an end to one-party rule. If interactions prompt the defenders to seek help, US officials should be prepared to offer sanctuary and asylum.
  • Continue to provide financial resources for human rights defenders. This is one of Washington’s most important contributions to the defense of human rights across China. Beijing’s hostility makes this aid considerably more complex. But creative approaches are possible.
  • Publicly recognize the work of human rights defenders as an essential component and source of US policy decisions on China. Too often the US treats the Chinese government and Chinese Communist Party as legitimate by default; Washington can change the dynamics by elevating defenders and their work in policy debates.

3. Strengthen the US government’s apparatus for securing political prisoner release.

  1. At every diplomatic meeting between US officials and their Chinese counterparts, ask for the immediate and unconditional release of political prisoners. US officials’ requests should be strong and specific—not only for information or for proof of life, but also for the prisoners’ release. These requests should be made public, unless security dictates otherwise, to make it more difficult for Beijing to ignore them. The US should also be prepared to offer asylum in the US or coordinate with partner countries to resettle prisoners who desire refuge beyond China’s borders.
  2. Emphasize the release of political prisoners with political or national security significance. Efforts should focus on family members of US citizens and political prisoners of interest to US national security. Priority political prisoners include Uyghurs like Gulshan Abbas, Ilham Tohti, Rahile Dawut, and Ekpar Asat; Tibetans like the eleventh Panchen Lama, Go Sherab Gyatso, and Konchok Nyima; Hong Kongers like Jimmy Lai, Gwyneth Ho, and Joshua Wong; persecuted Christians like Pastor Wang Yi; and human rights defenders like Gao Zhisheng, Yu Wenshang, and Ding Jiaxi.
  3. Create an Office for Political Prisoner Advocacy (OPPA) in the State Department. The office could be placed under the authority of the under secretary for civilian security, democracy, and human rights (the J Bureau), or under the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and be tasked with coordinating and managing US efforts to secure political prisoner release globally. Its priority would be to advocate for the release of political prisoners relevant to US national security. Congress should require the office to release an annual report identifying key political prisoners and what the office, civil society, and Congress have done or can do to secure their release.A special envoy should lead the OPPA. The envoy should be Senate confirmed and of ambassador rank, and he or she could serve as a liaison between the executive branch, Congress, and civil society. This would centralize the processes for securing political prisoner release, updating families on the status of political prisoners, and coordinating government and civil society responses to extrajudicial imprisonment.

4. Develop and implement responses to the CCP’s past and ongoing atrocity crimes.

  1. Lead efforts to hold perpetrators accountable. Democracies, as leaders in the international community, should hold perpetrators accountable for atrocity crimes and prevent future crimes from occurring. Atrocity crimes are debilitating for victims and survivors, and a failure to hold perpetrators accountable correlates with weak governance. This makes prevention of future atrocity crimes in the interest of the US and like-minded countries around the globe.
  2. Increase monitoring for early warning signs of atrocity crimes in Tibet. The CCP piloted many of the policies it currently uses against Uyghurs in Tibet, and many are still in effect there. This includes, among other things, forced labor, severe violations of civil and political liberties, undermining of local culture, and invasive DNA collection. Given the similarities between the Tibetan and Uyghur experiences, the US government should implement policies to prevent the escalation of atrocity crimes like crimes against humanity or genocide. As a component of this process in Tibet, the US should seek to restart dialogue with the Dalai Lama. And if there is evidence that the CCP has already committed crimes against humanity or genocide, the US secretary of state should issue an atrocity determination.
  3. Create a fund for Uyghur survivors of the CCP’s ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity. The US should place fines collected from repeat violators of the UFLPA into a fund administered by the Treasury or State Department payable to Uyghur survivors of genocide and crimes against humanity. These funds could also go toward organizations providing direct support to Uyghur survivors of forced labor and other injustices, including various forms of technical assistance, counseling and rehabilitation services, and advocacy.

5. Offer dissidents safe haven.

  1. The US should strengthen its refugee resettlement program. Safety within US borders is one of the most practical tools to offer support. Guarantees of safety and legal protection enable individuals from across China to advocate more strongly for change. Policymakers should expand support for resettlement agencies, ensure adequate funding, address delays in processing social security numbers and employment authorization documents, and increase the availability of affordable housing. The US should also continue to invest in other humanitarian pathways including humanitarian parole programs, private sponsorship programs like Welcome Corps, and family reunification programs. Welcome Corps, in particular, may need to be amended in order for Uyghurs, Hong Kongers, and Tibetans to be eligible for private resettlement routes. Importantly, public-private partnership programs should supplement, not supplant, asylum access at the border.
  2. Consider priority refugee and asylum processing for certain groups across China. Uyghurs, Tibetans, Hong Kongers, and peaceful critics of the CCP face permanent persecution, and the lives of those who have escaped the country would be endangered upon return to China. Long wait times expose asylees to human rights violations and other atrocities. Many Uyghurs have waited more than 10 years for their asylum hearings in the US, an unconscionable amount of time to live with uncertainty about one’s future safety. Countless others, like the 50 Uyghurs currently held in detention in Thailand, should be considered for priority processing, perhaps under Priority 1 (P-1) status. Any US embassy official can recommend an individual or set of individuals for this priority processing.
  3. Consider whether humanitarian parole can be reformed to offer permanent pathways for resettlement in the US. The United States should offer more protections for human rights defenders in exile, dissidents, and diaspora communities experiencing transnational repression. For example, Washington can expand humanitarian pathways for permanent legal status in the United States, as well as fund and support nongovernmental and civil society organizations that provide services for survivors. Humanitarian parole is a useful tool in cases where refugees are in urgent need of resettlement (like a recently released political prisoner or a person whose life is at risk). But it does not currently offer a permanent pathway to citizenship. The US government should consider reforming humanitarian parole to offer more permanent solutions for persecuted individuals.

6. Develop effective domestic and multilateral responses to transnational repression.

  1. Define transnational repression and identify what tools the US government has to protect and support survivors. Transnational repression brings the CCP’s human rights offenses directly to US soil. Washington and its allies need to develop a plan to respond, with a focus on creating readily available legal mechanisms to punish perpetrators and provide relief for victims. Congress and the executive branch should work together to define transnational repression. They should then ensure authorities have the training and legal remit to address these situations. Officials should be able to gather and share information, collect and report statistics, provide training and outreach, and guide survivors to services and support. Means of support may include psychological and social services as well as immigration and legal aid.
  2. Develop a clear, survivor-centered policy response to transnational repression with allies and partners. The US should work jointly with friends and allies to raise transnational repression as a priority issue and develop international norms to address it. An initial working group could include the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, Korea, Australia, and other like-minded nations.

 

The contents of this policy memo are the result of the collective efforts of the nonpartisan China Human Rights Working Group run by Hudson Senior Fellow Olivia Enos. The group’s mission is to identify the top policy priorities for advancing human rights in US policy toward the Chinese Communist Party.

Group members include:

Rushan Abbas, Campaign for Uyghurs
Anita Chang, ChinaAid
Sophie Richardson, Chinese Human Rights Defenders
Jonathan Stivers, Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong
Yaqiu Wang, Freedom House
Anna Kwok, Hong Kong Democracy Council (HKDC)
Megan Khoo, Hong Kong Watch
Miles Yu, Hudson Institute
Sophie Luo, Humanitarian China
Franz Matzner, International Campaign for Tibet
Corban Teague, McCain Institute
Pema Doma, Students for a Free Tibet
Elfidar Iltebir, Uyghur American Association
Omer Kanat, Uyghur Human Rights Project
Adrian Zenz, Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation
Joey Siu, Washingtonians Supporting Hong Kong (DC4HK)

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