The United States generally enjoys close and collaborative relationships with the European Union and Western European countries, despite often major differences on trade, bilateral issues, and foreign/security policy. EU and Western European interests overlap – often significantly -- with those of the United States, regardless of who is in power in Washington, Brussels, or other major capitals. These allies often apply their significant financial, political, and other resources to the advantage of both sides of the Atlantic. The sides have managed their differences fairly well over the decades because interests far outweigh differences. Cooler heads usually prevail over the passions and tensions of the moment. If past is prologue, this pattern can continue with the Trump Administration, despite much sharper rhetoric and higher tensions on trade, defense and other issues. It remains to be seen whether, as some assert, the sides are entering a fundamentally new world.
While the contours of the next chapter in transatlantic relations take shape, differences remain – often significant -- given unique U.S. interests and priorities on domestic U.S. and global challenges. The Middle East is one such area. Since October 7, the EU and other Western European states have staked out positions on Israel that differ from the Biden and Trump Administrations, both of which put Tel Aviv at the center of their efforts in the region despite their different approaches. The EU and Western Europeans also differ on such other U.S. priorities in the broader region as Syria and Iran.
The Middle East is a case study of how the United States will find a higher degree of congruence with the countries along the Eastern Flank of NATO, especially Central Europe (CE). The countries of “new Europe” can often be easier partners for U.S. policy than those in “old Europe.” In the past this has usually concerned threat perceptions regarding Russia, energy, and security issues, but Middle East policy also presents options. A Trump Administration frustrated by policies coming out of Brussels or western European capitals would do well to look more to Central Europe for allies even if they may have fewer resources, less bandwidth, and other priorities in their immediate neighborhood.
Europe and Western Europe
The European Union and its member states care a lot about the Middle East. European Commission policies have ebbed and flowed over time depending on who presides over the European Council and the Commission or is the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy and Vice President (HRVP) of the European Union. However, they have often differed on USG priorities like Israel / Palestinians, Syria, Iran, and migration and terrorism. Western European states have strongly advocated for the Palestinian cause and have been more accommodating on Syria and Iran, for example, despite usually strong ties with Israel, recognition that Iran is a state sponsor of terror, and populations that increasingly oppose uncontrolled migration and believe Islamism undermines their societies from within. Some EU member states – e.g. Spain, Belgium, Slovenia, Ireland, and others -- have tended to accord greater priority to the Palestinian cause in Israel-related matters.
Unwavering EU support for the UN Relief and Works Agency has continued for decades despite strong evidence that it supported Hamas and siphoned enormous resources into terrorism-related activities. The EU advocated for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action while Iran was fomenting terrorism, extremism, and instability in the region. The EU has long been clear that Jerusalem should be the capital of the two states. In 2011, European Parliament President Martin Schulz froze relations with Israel until he saw the peace process move forward. In 2015, the EU required goods originating in areas occupied by Israel to be labeled.
For decades Israel has considered the EU approach tilted in favor of its adversaries. Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar recently called EU policy “very hostile, unbalanced, (and) one-sided” under former HRVP Josep Borrell. Borrell’s successor, current HRVP Kaja Kallas, seeks to reset the relationship, but the Commission still differs with Israel over the future of the Palestinians and the Israeli response to October 7, treating the Gaza operation as disproportionate and violating international law. Israel’s operation against Hezbollah added to strains after Israeli strikes hit UN peacekeeping posts in southern Lebanon. The launch in March of what the Commission has billed its “first high-level political dialogue” with Palestinian PM Mustafa represents a desire to recalibrate ties with Palestinian leaders. The EU has also been more flexible on Syria and Iran and other autocracies.
Central Europe
Central European states have historically not played much of a role in the Middle East. They have no colonial legacy, have had other priorities and less diplomatic heft than the Western Europeans, and have never been significant providers of humanitarian assistance. However, for a range of historical, political, religious, and cultural reasons many have in recent years prioritized relations with Israel over the Palestinians and view Syria and Iran skeptically, in contrast to most other EU member states.
There are many reasons for this, starting with the fact that Central and Eastern Europe contained some 80 percent of the Jewish population in Europe until 1882 when Tsar Alexander III enacted the "May Laws" that restricted Jewish rights on business activities, education, and property ownership. The industrial scale murder by the Nazis and their allies of a very large percentage of these communities during the Holocaust has produced a sharp awareness of the tragedy that overlay the region’s rich Jewish legacy. This has led countries of the region to pay closer attention to Israel and to prioritize its success. During and after the Holocaust, many survivors found refuge in what is now Israel and became leaders of the new Jewish state, reinforcing their interest in and ties with Central Europe. While CE countries have interests elsewhere in the Middle East, Israel tends to be a very high, if not the primary focus, for most CE countries in the region. These factors predispose CE countries to pay more attention to Israel, and Israel to Central Europe, and are mutually reinforcing.
Successive Israeli governments increased their focus on Central Europe after the EU began to expand in 2004 to admit CE countries, prioritizing Brussels less and emphasizing bilateral relationships more. When Benjamin Netanyahu became Prime Minister in 2009, he saw CE countries as potentially able to influence the EU from within and to counteract pro-Palestinian sentiments. He cultivated right-wing politicians like Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, visiting Budapest regularly and in July 2017 even taking part in a summit there of the Visegrad 4, where he criticized the EU, referring to it as the only such association of countries that imposes conditions on its members for their ties to Israel. Netanyahu also cultivated Poland’s Jaroslaw Kaczynski, whose opposition to left-liberal politics and emphasis on sovereignty appealed to him. PM Netanyahu has since tended to bilateralize Israel’s relations and found CE countries generally strong partners that do not press the Palestinian issue as hard as do other EU member states. Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions movements are also not as strong in CE countries as in other EU member states.
The origins of Zionism and current Israeli politics can also be traced to Central Europe. Early Israeli leaders like David Ben-Gurion were very familiar with ideological currents there such as socialism, social democracy, Zionism, and nationalism. Numerous Israeli leaders of various political orientations were born in Poland including former Prime Ministers Yitzak Shamir, Menachem Begin, and David Ben-Gurion. Over the decades, Israeli political life has contained elements of the regions from which its leaders came, which often meant Central and Eastern Europe.
Most CE countries have close and productive relationships with Israel, regardless of the party in power in the respective countries, despite inheriting ties from the Soviet period that prioritized the Palestinians, Syria, and Iran and being required to support the two-state policy upon accession to the EU. CE countries’ bloody history with dictatorships predisposes them to be skeptical of the Syrian and Iranian regimes. Many CE leaders are appalled by the terror networks in Gaza and Lebanon, especially after October 7, and oppose the role Iran plays in the Israel/Palestinian dynamic and the broader region. Their traditional approach to divisive cultural issues and preference for Judeo-Christian civilization heightens concerns about Muslim immigration and terrorism, particularly after the Syrian Civil War and 2015 migration crisis. The popularity of right of center parties in Central Europe has found sympathy among right-wing parties in Israel. CE leaders are also aware that close ties with Israel can have advantages in relations with the United States.
CE countries fall into four broad categories on the issue of Israel / Palestinians, Syria, and Iran: Group 1) Czech Republic, Hungary, and Romania; Group 2) Austria and Bulgaria; Group 3) Slovakia and the Baltic States; and 4) the special case of Poland.
Group One: Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania
The Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania stand out from other EU member states by their strong support for Israel, including on Israel-related votes at the UN. They were open to the U.S. move of diplomatic offices to Jerusalem, have been supportive of U.S. initiatives in the region, including mistakes like the Iraq War that required major financial and human sacrifices, and have been more skeptical of Iran than other EU member states. They are tougher on migration and are watching trends in Islamism and terrorism in Western Europe with great concern. They prioritize Holocaust commemoration and education even as broad-based property restitution or compensation for losses during the Holocaust is a distant dream.
Czech Republic: The Czech Republic has come a long way since the Soviet period, when it toed the Kremlin’s anti-Zionist line, experienced periods of serious anti-Semitism, severed diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv after the Six-Day War to side with the Palestinians, and were close to dictatorships in the region. The Communist period was an outlier as, earlier in the 20th century, major politicians like former President of Czechoslovakia Tomas Masaryk and his son, Jan (as Foreign Minister) strongly supported the Zionist cause during the British Mandate. Prague provided key diplomatic assistance for Israel’s establishment as a state in the 1948 UN vote (after the 1948 Communist putsch in Czechoslovakia) and backed Israel in the 1948 war by selling large amounts of weaponry and training its pilots. This led Israel’s first PM, David Ben-Gurion, to attribute Czech support to saving his country. Other major Israeli leaders have echoed his view.
In 1989, President Vaclav Havel reverted to past Czechoslovak practice when he made it one of his first priorities to restore diplomatic relations with Israel and praised the contributions Jews made to Czech and Slovak culture. This policy has characterized the bilateral relationship since the collapse of Communism and the Warsaw Pact. Havel’s successors from other political parties have continued this approach, which included support for Israel at the UN when other EU member states did not, as well as unique military cooperation. In 2012, for example, the Czech Republic was the only EU member state to vote with Israel against upgrading Palestine to a “non-member observer state.”
The Czech Republic was also one of a few EU member states to respond positively after the United States decided to move its Embassy to Jerusalem in 2017. It blocked an EU statement censuring the Trump Administration’s decision, voted to recognize Jerusalem as the capital, and in 2021 opened an office of the Embassy that focused on trade and culture. It did not, however, move its Chancery, continues to back a two-state solution, and has not been as visible as other EU member states in rejecting the International Criminal Court arrest warrant against PM Netanyahu. There is no institutionalized relationship between Likud and a Czech political party, as in the case of Hungary.
After October 7, Foreign Minister Jan Lipavsky was the first EU FM to visit Israel and Prague was one of only 14 states that voted against a UN resolution calling for a humanitarian ceasefire in Gaza. Prague argued that the resolution was biased against Israel. In February, Lipavsky publicly proclaimed that “Israel will always be our most important Mideast ally” and announced that the Czech Republic would act as a NATO Contact Point in Israel. Czechia remains one of the most vocal supporters of Israel in Europe. While Czechia has been excellent in Holocaust commemoration and remembrance, however, like most other countries it has not handled property restitution / compensation as well.
On Syria, the Czech Republic has been the protecting power for the United States since 2012, when the USG suspended Embassy operations following the beginning of the Syrian Civil War. In the 14 years since then, a Czech diplomat has been providing services to American citizens as well as unique insights into developments in the country. While some of the Czech Ambassador’s actions – e.g. her Schengen visa policy and comments about Syrian domestic politics -- have sparked controversy, her support for U.S. interests in an exceptionally difficult environment has drawn praise, especially in view of the collapse of Assad and transition to the HTS regime.
The Czech Republic’s historically very strong human rights policy has also been visible on Iran. Its politicians are some of the few in the EU who organize conferences on issues such as liberty and democracy in a secular Iran that feature opposition activists like the Crown Prince and son of the late Shah. Czech politicians and diplomats regularly condemn – often in unusually strong language -- Iranian violations of human rights at the UN, the European Parliament, and elsewhere. The government speaks with a clear voice at the IAEA on Iranian nuclear violations.
Hungary: Hungary went through a similar pattern during the Soviet period, with periods of antisemitism and anti-Zionism and subordinating its policy to that of the Kremlin by breaking diplomatic relations with Israel after the 1967 war until non-resident interest sections opened in both capitals in 1987 and full relations were restored in 1989. During that period, the Communist regime prioritized relations with the Palestinians and other Arab dictatorships. It also did not challenge the mullahs in Iran after 1979. During the 1990s, the relationship was modest and pragmatic, as the government pursued primarily economic and cultural ties, and supported expansion of ties between the Jewish community, the largest in the CE region even after having one of the largest populations in Europe before the Holocaust, and Israel.
The turning point in the bilateral relationship came in 2005 when then-opposition leader Viktor Orban visited Jerusalem and saw in Benjamin Netanyahu a kindred spirit whose views on national identity, sovereignty, and cultural and economic policies aligned with his. After both politicians were reelected Prime Minister, Netanyahu in 2009 and Orban in 2010, ties became closer and expanded into the political and diplomatic sphere. The Arab Spring and Syrian Civil War prompted Orban to view close relations with Jerusalem as buttressing Hungarian interests during a period of increasing turbulence on the edge of Europe that could have an impact on migration flows, which he strongly opposed. In recent years Israeli political philosophers like Yoram Hazony, author of the book “The Virtue of Nationalism,” have become quite popular in Hungary.
Meanwhile, Netanyahu was looking to reduce his political isolation in the EU and Hungary was a logical choice of an ally. Likud and Fidesz institutionalized their relationship after Netanyahu was reelected in 2015. The migration crisis in Europe that year led to major criticism of Hungary by the EU and the Obama Administration, which Orban considered unjust and strengthened his sense of solidarity with Netanyahu, who also saw himself as being unjustly treated by European and North American establishments. In recent years, Hungary has increasingly made use of its vote to block the EU from issuing statements condemning Israel on Palestinian-related issues. In 2018, Hungary went so far as to vote with Israel at the UN on two Palestinian resolutions, a rarity for EU member states that tend at best to abstain from such controversial issues.
Hungary also voted against an EU statement condemning the U.S. decision to move its Embassy to Jerusalem in 2017, arguing that there was no persuasive reason for the Commission to opine on the issue. This had positive consequences for Hungary’s relations with the United States as the State Department noticed, which paved the way for Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto to meet with then Secretary of State Mike Pompeo shortly after, the first such meeting in some six years. Hungary also opened a trade office in Jerusalem in 2021, and in 2024 PM Orban became the first EU leader to invite PM Netanyahu to Hungary despite an active ICC arrest warrant.
PM Orban has been very vocal in stressing Hungary’s openness to Jews and the vibrancy of the local Jewish community. He has pushed a “no-tolerance policy” of antisemitism, provided significant support to the country’s Jewish community, and regularly argues that his policies have led Jews to feel safer in Hungary than anywhere else in Europe. His critics accuse him of favoring a minority in the Hungarian Jewish community and of antisemitism for singling out his archenemy, George Soros, who is Jewish, for opprobrium. His Fidesz party has used images of Soros during electoral campaigns that appear antisemitic. Prominent Jewish politicians and pundits say criticism of Soros is not necessarily antisemitism, but this debate will never be resolved satisfactorily given the huge divide between the pro- and anti-Orban camps and the nature of some of the Fidesz depictions of Soros. PM Orban has benefited from a 2017 clarification by the Israeli Foreign Ministry that criticism of Soros is not illegitimate because he “continuously undermines Israel’s democratically elected governments by funding organizations that defame the Jewish state and seek to deny it the right to defend itself.” Hungary has been excellent in Holocaust commemoration and remembrance but has also made little progress on property restitution or compensation.
A convergence of political philosophies and interests between PM Orban and PM Netanyahu has produced a relationship where both sides enjoy particular influence with the other and has enabled them to weather storms like Orban’s 2017 speech when he praised Admiral Miklos Horthy, the Hungarian head of state and Nazi collaborator during WWII. While it would be logical for these ties to continue if the leader of either country were no longer in power, the ideological and personal nature of the ties – Netanyahu calls Orban “a true friend” -- suggests it may weaken in such an eventuality.
Hungary’s focus in Syria has been mostly on trade and migration but the government has supported persecuted Christian minorities by building churches and providing humanitarian assistance. Hungary differs in this respect from other EU member states, which show little interest in this issue. Budapest maintains pragmatic ties with Iran that tend to focus on trade and recruiting students to study in Hungary. In 2015, PM Orban traveled to Tehran to meet with Khamenei. FM Szijjarto has visited several times in recent years. He has called the bilateral relationship “free of political disputes,” reflecting the country’s foreign policy emphasizing economic connectivity.
Romania: Romania followed the Czechoslovak and Hungarian pattern during the communist period but subordinated its policy less to the Kremlin than the others. While Bucharest prioritized close relations with the Palestinians and other Arab autocracies and did not challenge the mullahs after the 1979 Iranian Revolution, it also did not break diplomatic relations with Israel after the 1967 War. Romania was the only Soviet Bloc state not to do so and elevated its representation in Tel Aviv to Embassy status two years later. Since 1989, Romania has also broken ranks with other EU member states, as it did in 2017 when it joined the Czech Republic and Hungary to block a vote condemning the United States for moving its Embassy to Jerusalem and when it votes for Israel at the UN or against resolutions that condemn it.
A major reason for this special relationship with Israel was then dictator Nikolai Ceausescu’s somewhat independent foreign policy, which carved out for Romania a small part in talks between Tel Aviv and the Palestinians during the 1970s and 1980s. The fact that Romania had the third largest Jewish population in Europe prior to the Holocaust also played a role. Romania is the third largest country of origin for Jews who emigrated to Israel during the Communist period, even after Ceausescu shamelessly extorted them on their way out. Romania is currently among the top three safest countries for Jews in Europe, although antisemites have attacked the Israeli Embassy in Bucharest, a rarity in other CE countries. While Romania has been excellent in Holocaust commemoration and remembrance, it has not handled property restitution/compensation as well.
The bilateral relationship, however, only goes so far, as highlighted by divisions between the Romanian government and its President. For example, after the United States moved its Embassy to Jerusalem, then-PM Viorica Dancila in March 2019 announced, prematurely, that Romania would as well. This caught President Klaus Iohannis – with his key constitutional role in foreign policy -- by surprise and caused him to spike the initiative. Romania nevertheless opened an Embassy Office there, the third EU member state to do so and one of the relatively few such representations – mostly from CE -- in the city. Romania also cultivates business relations with Arab states as well as Iran and other Islamist dictatorships.
Group Two: Austria and Bulgaria
After decades during which Austria was among the more pro-Palestinian, pro-Iranian, and pro-Syrian in Europe, it has in recent years become one of the more pro-Israel and has potential as a force multiplier. The legacy of Nazi war criminals like Adolf Hitler and Adolf Eichmann in the Holocaust as well as post-WWII scandals with anti-Israel and antisemitic elements ran deep. Former Austrian President and UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim lied about his service in the Wehrmacht and knowledge of its war crimes. There were outbreaks of antisemitism into the 1960s. Former Chancellor Bruno Kreisky (who was Jewish) was vocal in his criticism of Israel and pursued clear pro-Palestinian policies. The far-right Freedom Party (FPOe) was a part of the coalition government in the early 2000s. All this took place against the backdrop of Austria’s unwillingness to take real responsibility for its role in WWII and the Holocaust. This historical baggage makes Austria’s volte face in recent years even more impressive.
After decades of prioritizing the Palestinians, Austria has voted with Israel at the UN in recent years, symbolizing a change that former Austrian FM Alexander Schallenberg insists “cannot be reversed.” Domestically, the government has been prioritizing better ties with Jewish groups. In foreign policy, instead of the tense bilateral relationship in past decades – which led Israel to go so far as to withdraw its ambassador more than once because of Austrian domestic developments -- the neutral state entered a strategic relationship with the Jewish state. Former Chancellor Sebastian Kurz laid the foundation in 2017-18 when he sought to counteract the negative effects of his coalition with the FPOe and take a moral leadership role in Middle East and North American affairs. Austrian embassies abroad spend a lot of time cultivating Jewish leaders and on Israel-related issues. Bilateral relations have improved to the point that some Jewish leaders consider Austria Israel’s main friend in the EU. Even allowing for hyperbole, mutual sentiment is positive, deep, and indisputable.
Austria has dialed back its pro-Syria and pro-Iran policies. On Syria, the government has focused on mitigating the negative consequences of -- and repatriating -- the 100,000 refugees who since the 2015 migration crisis have settled in Austria. Vienna has gone along with EU loosening its policy towards the new Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) regime but has not been visible in engaging it. On Iran, Vienna has been relatively outspoken in criticizing the regime. During his chancellorship, Kurz openly called out Hezbollah and publicly admonished the Iranian leader for questioning Israel’s right to exist. His successors have not been as vocal but have also had little engagement with the mullahs. The volte face Kurz started continues to some extent.
Bulgaria: Bulgaria followed the same pattern on Middle East policy during the Soviet period as the other Warsaw Pact states, prioritizing the Palestinian cause and relations with pro-Moscow Arab/Muslim states, maintaining correct but not close relations with Israel, and then severing diplomatic relations because of the Six-Day War. Relations with Israel also suffered a setback in 1955 after Bulgaria accidentally shot down an El Al civilian aircraft.
The bilateral relationship is now stronger than that of many other EU member states because of Bulgaria’s positive role during the Holocaust, when leading politicians and civil society in an unprecedented manner stood up for Jews in the country and prevented deportations to Nazi death camps, thus saving essentially the entire community, almost 50,000 Jews, while Bulgaria was formally allied with Nazi Germany. Bulgarian diplomats also facilitated transit of an additional 20,000 Jews from other parts of Europe. Bulgaria’s role, however, in neighboring Macedonia and Thrace was not positive but unusual goodwill remains for Bulgarians in Israel because of their role in Bulgaria proper. Most of the pre-war Jewish population emigrated to Israel and plays a positive role in the bilateral relationship to the present day.
Bulgaria did not join the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Romania in opening a small outpost in Jerusalem after the United States moved its Embassy there in 2018. Sofia has conditioned the move of its embassy on the signing of a peace deal between Israel and the Palestinians but appointed an Honorary Consul. Bulgaria also voted against the U.S. Embassy move at the UN.
Since October 7, Bulgaria has banned pro-Palestine and pro-Hamas demonstrations and joined the tiny number of countries that voted with Israel at the UN, which leads Israel to consider Sofia one of its most dependable partners. Manifestations of antisemitism are not as widespread in Bulgaria as in Western Europe. Israel values Bulgaria for its stabilizing role in Southeastern Europe and the Balkans and its influence with Turkey given Tel Aviv’s strained relations with Ankara. Israel has encouraged Bulgaria to join a “common front” against Iran, including by designating the IRGC a terrorist group, but Sofia has not yet done so, even as memories of the 2012 Burgas terrorist attack -- with a Lebanese Hezbollah connection -- that killed five Israeli tourists dim.
Others: Slovakia and the Baltic States
Other countries forcibly incorporated into the USSR and Soviet Bloc had similar experiences as the rest. All were required to prioritize the Palestinian and other Soviet causes during the communist era. Those generally clashed with those of the United States. All this changed during 1989-1991 as the countries jettisoned their Soviet-era policies even as they retained some, particularly the two-state solution and a pragmatic approach to some of the autocracies in the Middle East.
Slovakia has a pro-Israel policy but is less visible than the other CE states. It opened the Slovak Institute in Jerusalem in 2021 following the U.S. move of its embassy in 2018 and the subsequent opening of a few other CE offices there but has otherwise not strayed from EU policy. Lithuania has a reputation as particularly pro-Israel because of its once large Jewish population, the positive role it played in the country’s history, and memory of the Holocaust, which decimated it. This Jewish history distinguishes its approach from that of Latvia and Estonia, both of which are also quite pro-Israel but had smaller Jewish populations. All three countries have concluded agreements on restitution and/or compensation for Jewish property lost in the Holocaust.
None of these countries has been particularly visible on Syria or Iran but they all share a certain outlook on the Middle East because they are small states, were victims of aggression, prioritize democracy, human rights, and the West, and oppose Islamism and uncontrolled migration into the EU. As Russia forges ever closer relations with Iran, they also share the same enemy. Of the three, Lithuania tends to be most visible in its opposition to dictatorship.
The Special Case of Poland
Poland is unique among CE states in its relationship with Israel. On the one hand, it has elements in common with the other states: a common approach to the Palestinians and Arab/Muslim world during the Soviet era, advocacy of the two-state solution as an EU member state, and a pragmatic approach to trade with countries in the region. However, Poland’s history of welcoming Jews since the Statute of Kalisz in 1264, which granted special protection from persecution, led to the country having one of the largest populations of Jews in Europe and more than 800 years of continuous presence in Poland proper or, during the partitions, territory that was Poland but occupied by foreign powers. During the Nazi occupation, Poles assisted Jews in large numbers and comprise the largest nationality group (6,992) among the Righteous Among Nations at Yad Vashem.
However, friction between Poles and Jews at various times, Poland’s uniquely horrific experience as the location of the largest number of Nazi death camps, concentration camps, forced labor camps, and resettlement and transit camps, as well as anti-Jewish violence after WWII have also complicated ties more than elsewhere, as historical memory is difficult for both sides. The Holocaust has brought the countries closer together because of their shared suffering but this has also caused tension because not only Jews suffered enormously. Eighty years after the end of the Holocaust, Jews still have vivid memories of the atrocities committed against them in Nazi-occupied Poland – by far the most from Nazis but also from Poles – but so do Poles have vivid memories of their own suffering.
In recent years, the bilateral relationship has experienced flare-ups, as when the Polish parliament in 2018 criminalized any reference to the Polish people or the Polish state as complicit in the Holocaust and other Nazi war crimes as well as use of the term “Polish death camp” or “Polish concentration camp.” Tensions worsened in 2019 after media misquoted a nuanced and accurate reference by PM Netanyahu on the matter of Poles’ collaboration with the Nazis. FM Israel Katz made the issue worse by claiming that “Poles imbibe antisemitism with their mothers’ milk” and refusing to apologize. These caused the cancellation of several visits, including a Visegrad 4 summit in Israel, the first scheduled for outside Europe. It also led to the withdrawal of ambassadors and an overall downturn in relations. It took until July 2022 for relations to return to normal.
The legacy of the Holocaust has made the issue of Israel more controversial in Poland than it would otherwise be. While Poland has a solid record on Holocaust education, commemoration, and remembrance and has restituted or compensated some 45 percent of claims for Jewish communal property, it has not been able to resolve the property issue for two reasons: 1) the enormity of the assets that would have to be restituted or compensated for; and 2) the fact that no Polish government of any political orientation dares take on this issue without addressing Nazi Germany’s role in these property losses and who pays compensation. This has been an insurmountable issue, with Germany saying the issue is closed and Poland saying it is not. Poland is the only EU member state with significant Holocaust-era property issues that has not passed a national comprehensive private property restitution law.
Israeli politicians do not press the Polish government publicly to resolve the property issue but it simmers under the surface. Polish politicians decline to deal with it unless and until Germany addresses the matter of compensation for Nazi crimes committed against Poles, which Berlin considers closed. The matter became even more complicated after then-FM Rau in October 2022 presented a diplomatic note to the German government for 1.3 trillion euros to compensate for property losses during WWII, essentially war reparations. Even pro-German Polish politicians cannot ignore the reparations issue because the losses occurred primarily during the Nazi occupation or were effectuated by the Nazis. Their magnitude is much higher than elsewhere in Central Europe, and Polish governments refuse to compensate for losses for which the Nazis were responsible.
Despite this complicated and at times emotional relationship with Israel, Poland was a positive player on Middle East issues during the first Trump Administration. In 2019, the Morawiecki government hosted a Middle East conference with a major Iran component, an issue where there were key differences between the United States and the EU. In 2020, Poland supported President Trump’s Middle East peace plan. Since returning to power in 2023, the Tusk government has elevated the role of Brussels and Berlin in its foreign policy priorities and is less likely to diverge from their positions. Its UN voting record on Israel-related issues is poor. However, it also seeks to demonstrate its value to Washington, which provides an opening to engage with the Trump Administration on Middle East issues.
Conclusion
The rich, complex, and tragic history of Central Europe offers opportunities for the Trump Administration. While the first issue that comes to mind for the region is usually European security, there are many others. One is the potential the countries of the region have as partners to tackle other thorny issues. These snapshots demonstrate the potential some CE countries have on issues like the Middle East, should the Administration engage them. They can be multipliers and their support for U.S. policy goals should not be overlooked. Their alignment on Israel and other hot-button Middle East issues raises their value. What they may lack in resources and reach they make up for in an historically compatible worldview and strong willingness to collaborate with the United States.
Such cooperation of course depends on domestic and international political conditions, who is in power in Central Europe, the United States, and the Middle East, and the policies they pursue. Governments change, but the underlying factors in Central Europe are positive and show potential. Collaboration also depends on how the U.S. administration approaches the region. The first Trump Administration understood how valuable prioritizing the CE region was. There is no compelling reason not to continue this approach.
This analysis reminds that the European Commission and major Western European states not only differ in their approaches to Israel and other major Middle East challenges but are also often less congruent with U.S. interests and priorities there. The Obama and Biden Administrations prioritized the EU and major Western European players, and the results were not impressive. The Trump Administration should dust off its 2017-21 approach to Central Europe and seek to draw value from its relationships with its often more likeminded players, which can be willing and able partners. To make the most of the resources and opportunities these allies bring to the table, the Trump Administration should engage with them more intensively, especially bilaterally, as it did so successfully during its first term. That means paying closer attention to issues most of the countries in the region consider important such as the Putin and Russia problem.