SVG
Reports
Hudson Institute

To Change South Africa’s Behavior, Target ANC Officials

A performer holds an African National Congress flag while listening to Cyril Ramaphosa speak during the ANC Siyanqoba Rally on May 25, 2024, in Johannesburg, South Africa. (Chris McGrath via Getty Images)
Caption
A performer holds an African National Congress flag while listening to Cyril Ramaphosa speak during the ANC Siyanqoba Rally on May 25, 2024, in Johannesburg, South Africa. (Chris McGrath via Getty Images)

Why Current Approaches Fail

The tense United States–South Africa relationship deteriorated further when the Trump administration suspended nearly all aid to the country. The suspension was a warning to Pretoria to stop its hostile behavior toward the US. But Washington’s best option to change South Africa’s behavior and protect US interests without causing a total breakdown in bilateral relations is to transition to a targeted campaign against the specific officials responsible for Pretoria’s antagonism.

The Trump administration’s actions followed years of provocations by the South African government and the dominant African National Congress (ANC). The suspension announcement specifically mentioned Pretoria’s siding with Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran against Israel, as well as President Cyril Ramaphosa’s recent signing of a land expropriation bill. The announcement could have listed many more provocations.

Washington should confront any government that opposes US interests so aggressively. But cutting public health funding is too indiscriminate to induce the necessary changes in ANC behavior. Furthermore, given the dire state of African health infrastructure, the next global pandemic could originate from the continent. American support for Africa’s health infrastructure mitigates that risk and gives the US valuable public health research opportunities.

Another commonly discussed option is revoking South Africa’s access to America’s preferential trade program, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). But this also lacks the necessary precision to dissuade the ANC’s malign behavior. The communities that benefit most from the AGOA largely support South Africa’s pro-American political parties. Revoking AGOA access would damage South Africa’s economy, but it would not hurt specific ANC officials or meaningfully threaten their electoral chances. So losing access to AGOA is a price the party is likely willing to pay.

Finally, South Africa is currently run by a Government of National Unity (GNU), which contains some pro-American elements. A breakdown in US-SA relations might mean the collapse of the GNU, which in turn could empower truly radical and rabidly anti-American parties like uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK) or the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF).

A Targeted Campaign

An effective strategy for South Africa is important to US interests. The country’s Simonstown Naval Base sits near the confluence of the Atlantic and Indian Oceans and could be a node for a power like China to project might into the Indo-Atlantic region. China has sought an Atlantic naval base for years. If Beijing succeeds, it could more easily threaten the US homeland. That is a risk Washington needs to guard against, and maintaining a working relationship with Pretoria is an important step in doing so.

South Africa also attracts more US investment than any other African country, with around 600 American companies operating there. That constitutes only a fraction of US foreign direct investment. But robust commercial engagement is currently America’s best tool for competing with China in Africa, so it would be rash to unnecessarily sacrifice this leverage. This is especially true as South Africa, the dominant economy in its region, is a gateway to the rest of southern Africa.

A successful campaign would need to target South African officials responsible for the anti-American measures the government has implemented. Targets should be senior enough to demonstrate Washington’s seriousness. The campaign would strike the officials’ core interests like personal wealth and the ability to travel freely to places like the US.

Among other benefits of such a targeted campaign, cutting officials off from the money that funds their patronage networks could marginalize them within the party and government and allow less ideological members to assert themselves. Sanctions targeting corruption would also remind ordinary South Africans of the theft that some senior officials have engaged in, rather than potentially stoking anti-American anger as the use of broad-based measures might.

Finally, a targeted campaign could serve as a useful warning to officials of other antagonistic African governments. A demonstration of the US government’s capabilities to make their lives measurably worse might deter further anti-Western actions.

Available Tools

The US has a suite of relevant tools including visa bans and sanctions—and South Africa is a target-rich environment. The ANC is one of Africa’s most corrupt organizations. Additionally, Washington has determined that the government has not adequately addressed human rights violations, making specific ANC officials easy pickings for sanctions under the Global Magnitsky Act, which targets corruption and human rights abuses.

Furthermore, a little digging may reveal links between specific ANC officials and sanctioned Russian oligarchs. It is a matter of public record that the ANC accepted funds from one such oligarch, Viktor Vekselberg, making officials involved in that process vulnerable to secondary sanctions.

The terrorist financing that flows from and through South Africa could also serve as the basis for sanctions. For example, the country is a hub for Islamic State (ISIS) financing. Funding has also flowed through the country to Hamas and Hezbollah. South Africa’s role in terror financing is so significant that in 2022 the US Treasury Department sanctioned four South Africa–based ISIS financiers. The Financial Action Task Force subsequently placed South Africa on its grey list over the country’s inadequate action on terrorism financing and money laundering. Given the ANC’s involvement in almost every possible stream of corruption, it is plausible that some of its officials are guilty here as well.

The best outcome in the current US–South Africa showdown would be for the US to maintain a working relationship with South Africa that (1) prevents China from getting a naval base in Simonstown, (2) protects US investments in the country and paves the way for more, and (3) sustains the GNU, which currently prevents the further rise of extremist parties like MK and EFF.

But if the US does not meaningfully confront the ANC, the party will continue its decadeslong campaign against the West on behalf of the so-called progressive international revolutionary movement. If the status quo continues, a full breakdown in the US–South Africa relationship—and the attendant harm to substantive US interests—will be nearly inevitable. Washington’s best chance to prevent this is to target key anti-American officials in South Africa to marginalize them and warn others of what will come if they do not change course.